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CONDEMNING THE RACIST
PERSONALITY: WHY THE CRITICS OF
HATE CRIMES LEGISLATION ARE
WRONG
ANDREW E.:T/61,1're
INTRODUCTION
Hate crimes legislation enhances the punishment for an ordinary
crime, or creates a new substantive crime, if the offender is motivated
by certain prejudices, such as racism or anti-Semitism) For example,
*Professor, [toward University School of Law, former Assistant District Attorney, Philadel-
phia, PA; B.A., Queens College, 1978; J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School, 1981. The
author :banks his wife, Patricia V. Sun, Esq., and Professor Ellen Podgor for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Appreciation also goes to the author's research
assistants, Vicky Byrd and Mekka Jeffers, for their help in completing this article and to the
flowarcl University School of Law for its financial support of this project.
I See JAMES 13. JAcons & KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW & IDENTITY
Porrrics 6, 29, 33 (1998). Examples of punishment-enhancement statutes include Montana and
Alabama. In Montana, a person found guilty of any offense committed because of the victim's
race, creed, religion, color, or similar enumerated motivations may be sentenced to between two
and ten years imprisonment in addition to the punishment provided for the commission of the
underlying offense. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-222 (1997). Alabama, by contrast, creates a
mandatory minimum sentence for violent crimes stemming flour designated biases. See ALA. CODE
§ 3A-5-13 (1998). The Anti-Defamation League ("ADL") model "intimidation" and "instim-
tional vandalism" statutes are the paradigm examples of the new substantive offense approach to
hate crimes. JACOBS & POTTER, SHAM at 33. "Intimidation" is defined as committing [repass,
criminal mischief, harassment, tnenancing, assault, or other "appropriate statutorily proscribed
criminal conclude' (to be specified by the individual state) if done by reason of' the actual or
perceived race, color, religion, national origin, or sexual orientation of another indivklual or
group of individuals, Id. Intirnidation is defined to be one degree more serious a crime than the
underlying offense. The crinre of "institudourd vandalism" is committed by knowingly vandalizing
any church, synagogue; cemetary, school, or similar listed structures or adjacent grounds belong-
ing to religious groups. Id. at 31-35. Montana actually uses both approaches—an ADL-rnodcled
intimidation statute and punishment-enhancement Par all other bias crimes. See MoNT. Coat
ANN. § 45-4-221.
The term "hate crime" is a shorthand for a criminal offense motivated by antipathy toward
a racial or ethnic group or all individual because of his membership in that group. See FREDERICK
M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN LAW 9 (1999). There rue Iwo
broad categories of hate crimes legislation: the "discriminatory selection model" and the "racial
animus model." Id. at 29-30. Under the discriminatory selection model, what matters is that an
offender selected his victim based on the victim's race, gender, or ethnic group. Id. at 30. Why
he chose this method of selection is irrelevant. Id. Under the racial animus model, by contrast,
the offer aler's negative opinion toward the victim's group must be a central motivator for the
crime. See id. of 30, 35.
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the maximum sentence imposed on an assailant motivated by hatred
for African Americans would be greater than one motivated by a nasty
temper. Despite its enactment in numerous jurisdictions,' hate crimes
legislation has recently come under attack.3
Among the bases of attack, four are of particular interest to me.
First, critics of hate crimes legislation argue that hate crimes are no
more morally reprehensible than similar crimes motivated by greed,
power, lust, spite or pure sadism:
A con artist may defraud widows out of their life savings in
order to lead a life of luxury. An ideologue may assassinate a
political leader in order to dramatize his cause or to co-
erce decision makers into changing national policy. Are these
criminals less morally reprehensible than a gay hasher or a
black rioter who beats an Asian store owner? Of course not.
As the legal philosopher jeffrie Murphy has commented:
The racial animus model presents the clearest case for strong condemnation. For example,
a purse snatcher who selects women victims because lie thinks it easier to snatch their purses
than to pick men's wallets from male pockets acts without anti-woman motivation. Greed, not
gender-antipathy, explains why he selects his particular victims. See id. at 73-75. But an offender
who assaults women because lie hates them as a class acts from a particularly reprehensible
misogyny. See id. Discriminatory victim selection is often strong evidence of group animus, but it
is the presence of the animus itself that most clearly merits special punishment. See id. at 79. At
the very least, group animus motivated clime does more serious harm than group selection based
climes and should thus be punished more severely. See id. The arguments in this Article made
in defense of hate crimes legislation are thus strongest when applied to the racial animus
legislative model.
Federal legislation passed shortly after the Civil War can reach hate crimes but is not expressly
directed against theta, focusing on criminalizing conspiracies to violate federally guarenteed
rights (see 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1994)) and deprivations of federal rights by government officials (not
by private actors) based on race, color, or alienage (see 18 U.S.C. § 242). See also jAcoms &
POTTER, supra, at 37 (explaining scope of these statutes). Part of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 18
U.S.C. § 245, only reaches hate crimes in an amhigious way that makes it hard to classify whether
the Act fits the discriminatory selection or group animus models discussed here. Additionally,
the Act applies only if certain specified federally protected rights or state and local activities are
involved, See jAcotis & POTTER, supra, at 38 (analyzing 18 U.S.C. § 245); LAWRENCE, supra, at
35-39 (explaining the ambiguities in federal law). The Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement
Act of 1994 mandated revision of the United States Sentencing Guidelines "to provide sentencing
enhancements of not less than three offense levels for offenses that are hate crimes," Pub. Law
No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (Sept. 13, 1994), but this enhancement applies only to offenses that
are otherwise federal crimes. See NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, TIME IMPORTANCE OF
HATE CRIMES Laws 1 (Dec. 1997); see atso JAcmis & POTTER, Stipa, at 76-77 (summarizing
Enhancement Act's provisions). Proposed federal legislation would expand the scope of federal
hate crimes by eliminating the requirement that certain specified federal rights or state and local
activities be involved and by expanding the number of protected groups. Seel-11.R. 77, 106th Cong.
(1999).
2 See JAcoBs 8,- POTTER, supra note 1, at 29-44.
3
 See id.
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"[plerhaps all assaults, whether racial or not, involve motives
of humiliation and are thus evil to the same degree.'"
Critics further note that these offenders cannot be held fully culpa-
ble for their prejudices. A hate criminal might have been brought
up to believe that homosexuals, women, and blacks are inferior,
immoral and evil. According to this account, his prejudice was
imposed, not chosen, and should render him a candidate for a
lesser punishment, not a greater one.'
Second, critics of hate crimes legislation argue that the harm to
victims of hate crimes is no greater than that of other comparable
crimes. The injury to a victim whose legs arc broken by an assailant
armed with a baseball bat is not affected by the offender's motivation.°
Indeed, at least one social science study found that the psychological
pain of a hate crime is less than an ordinary crime, for the "ability'of
sonic hate violence victims to maintain their sell-esteem may he asso-
ciated with their attribution of responsibility for their attacks to the
prejudice and racism of others." 7
Third, critics contend that hate crimes are not the only crimes
that can have repercussions beyond the immediate victim, For exam-
ple, a killing or rape at a university is likely, according to various social
science studies, "to enhance feelings of vulnerability and fear" among
fellow students, friends, co-workers, relatives and neighbors of the
victim' Therefore, that bias-motivated crimes frighten and humiliate
minority group members does not warrant additional punishment of
the offender. Even if those communities are more frightened by bias
crimes than other crimes, that is an irrational fear that courts should
not Iegitimate.9
't I& at 80 (quoting jeffrie G. Murphy, Bias Crimes: What Do Haters Deserve?, 11 CRIM. J.
E-rt tics 23 (1902)).
5 See id. at 81. But see Kent Greenawalt, Reflections on Justifications for Defining Crimes by the
Category of Victim, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. Am. L. 617, 627.
See JACOBS & POTTER, supra note I at 811-82.
7 Arnold Barnes & Paul H. Emphros,s, The Impact of Hate Violence on Victims: Emotional and
Behavioral Responses to Attack, 39 Soc. WORK 247, 250 (1994); see also Inems & POtEER, 51(pra
Hole 1, at 82-84 (surveying what little empirical data is available).
"JAcotts & POTTER, Supra note 1, at 87 (quoting AMERICAN PsvcitoLociced. Assoc. TASK
FORCE ON THE VICTIMS OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE, FINAL REPORT 36 (Nov. 30, 1984)); see also
WESLEY G. SKOGAN & MICHAEL G. MAXFIELD, COPING WITH CRIME: INDIVIDUAL AND NEIGHBok-
HOOD REACTIONS (1981); KEVIN N. WRIGHT, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME Mrtli 2-15, 70-79
(1985),
"Jacobs and Potter argue that for black coninnolities to fear racially-motivated assaults by
whiles is no different from the white community experiencing greaten terror because some
robberies in that. community have been committed by blacks. &dm:oils & supra note
1, al 87-88. This comparison is misleading. It is indeed reprehensible kit' whites to worry more
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Finally, critics reject the claim that punishing hate crimes will
reduce group conflict. To the contrary, critics view hate crimes legisla-
tion as a manifestation of "identity politics"—individuals relating to
each other as members of groups, based on such characteristics as race,
gender, religion, and sexual orientation—to achieve the strategic ben-
efits of being recognized as "disadvantaged and victimized."'°
This Article attempts to refute these claims by arguing that critics
of hate crimes legislation have ignored the important roles of the
criminal law in condemning evil character and accommodating the
tensions between individualized and group justice. The Article makes
three core claims: (1) the psychological and moral need for individu-
alized justice is undermined when victims are harmed because they are
treated as members of a category rather than as unique beings; (2) in
an especially dangerous way, hate crimes contribute to a racist culture
that creates subordinate status for marginalized groups and raises the
risk of physical harms, such as further assault; and (3) racist assaults
rely on a despised theory of human worth that has been rejected by
our modern constitutional culture. This last point draws on a salient
historical example in which violent acts were routinely committed for
reasons of racial animus, thereby creating a caste-based social system:
American slavery. These three claims, once proven, set the stage for
understanding how hate crimes legislation promotes inter-group har-
mony by relying on political and emotional themes that should be
common to all American subcultures, rather than promoting a divisive
identity politics. TheSe three claims also recognize that hate crimes
legislation promotes a vision of virtuous citizen character in a republic,
a vision that requires us to condemn the racist personality.
• This last point—the importance of condemning the racist person-
ality—assumes a theory that I here outline but cannot defend in an
Article of this length: that the criminal law should embrace character
morality, rather than action morality. Action morality, the idea that
freely chosen actions determine moral blame, currently dominates
criminal law." Hate crimes legislation, critics contend, violates action
morality principles because hate crimes inquire into the offender's
about attacks on them by black than white assailants. The ordinary robber, however, is motivated
by greed. His race is not relevant to what level of fear his victims have a right to experience. If,
however, violent robberies are directed at blacks because they are black, or whites because they are
white, rather than because they have money, that is a reason for either community to feel a special
fright and humiliation. See infra Parts II, Ill and IV to understand why.
IG See JAcoas & POTTER, supra note I, at 5, 88-00.
II See Andrew E. Taslitz, Race and TWo Concepts of the Emotions in Date Rape [hereinafter
Taslitz, Two Concepts] (draft manuscript) (copy on file with author).
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motive. Motive—the reason why a criminal commits a crime—however,
can only be assessed by, and indeed is an aspect of, character. To punish
an offender for his motive is thus to penalize him for who he is rather
than what he has done.P2
Character morality, in contrast, holds that we should be punished
for causing certain harms that stein from who we are, rather than
merely for what we do.'" Character moralities seek to condemn and
deter evil character.tm 4 Character is an enduring disposition to behave
in particular ways in particular situations. 15 Such. an enduring disposi-
tion can be revealed only through an offender's actions. To the kind
of character moralists whom I follow here, therefore, punishment. is
deserved to the extent that a defendant's actions reflect his evil na-
ture." "Evil" is a complex notion and comes in degrees.' 7 At its most
extreme, an evil character is someone who finds pleasure in causing
another pain. 18 A less extreme form of evil involves indifference to how
one's actions hurt others.'`' Character moralities have both retributive
and utilitarian justifications. The retributivists seek to punish only to
the degree that one freely chooses to do harm because of one's char-
acter. 20 The utilitarians endeavor to punish evil character because that
approach most efficiently identifies those likely to inflict future harm.`'
Character moralists are unimpressed by the claim that prejudiced
individuals are less culpable because their upbringing precluded them
from choosing their actions at the time of the crimes. Such people
could, for example, have made efforts to change their racist personali-
ties by socializing with those of other races. 22
 Character moralists also
more openly embrace the role of the emotions, including retributive
emotions, in legal theory," and they are unashamed to craft a secular
12 See infra notes 71-98 and accompanying text.
15 Seil LAWRIE REZNEK, EVIL OR ILI.? JUSTIFYING THE INSANITY DEFENcy, 12-13,41-60 (1997).
14 Set id.
15 See id. at 12-13, 12; Andrew E. Toslit2, Myself Alone. Individualizing fitstice Through Psycho-
logiml Character Evidence, 52 Mo. L. REV. 1, 6-11 (1993) [hereinafter Taslitz, Mysrif illmmi; see
aim infra notes 71-98 and accompanying text;
ill See infra text accompanying notes 71-98.
17 See Taslitz, Two Concepts, supra note 11, at 6.
Set! COLIN MCGINN, ETHICS, EVIL, AND FICTION 62-63 (1997).
19 See id. at 66-67; ef. REZNEK, sn pna note 13, at 13 (1	 . define an evil person by his
propensity to harm others in the pursuit or his own selfish interests,"),
20 SeeTaslitz, Two Concepts, supra note 11, at 6.
21 See id. at 7.
22 See id. at 10. Some Character moralists argue on utilitarian grounds lO• punishing evil
character even if we never have any control over who we are and what we do, See generalbjoHN
Knots, FACING EVIL (1990).
° See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Concepts of Emotions in Criminal Law,
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definition of evil. 24 Moreover, because our character is partly consti-
tuted by the groups with which we identify, emphasizing character
enables us to examine the important connection between harm to
individuals and to the groups to which they belong.'" For all these
reasons, character morality offers a clearer vision of what makes hate
crimes especially reprehensible:2"
What, then, is a racist character? I define a racist personality as
one that finds pleasure in inflicting pain on a person because of that
person's race. A racist personality is therefore only one species of evil
character. 27 My task is to explain why this kind of evil character is worse
than, or at least importantly different from, other sorts of evil charac-
ter. In particular, I argue that violent wrongdoers whose character-
based group animus leads them to attack group members undermine
their victims' need for individualized justice, harm their victim groups'
status, raise the risk of further assaults, and damage values central to
our modern republican government. In these ways, these criminals are
more culpable, dangerous, and harmful than similarly situated offend-
ers not motivated by group hatred. Although this Article's focus is
limited to the paradigm case of racial violence, my analysis should ex-
96 CoLum. 1- REV. 269, 297 (1996); Taslitz, Two Concepts, supra note II, at 11 (explaining why
Kahan and Nussbaurn's theory is a character morality).
24 See KEKES, St/p/II note 22.
25 This is so because group identity is an essential part of character. See infra notes 64-70 arid
accompanying text.
26 As noted earlier, see supra note I, the ADL has played an important role in promoting
hate crimes legislation and has authored an influential model statute. See JAcoBs & P017ER, MOM
note I, at 33-36. The ADL's effort likely reflects a character morality. The ADL was part of the
intergroup relations movement, which by the 1950s had come to see prejudice as the result of a
flawed, even diseased, personality. See. STUART SVONKIN, JEWS AGAINST PREJUDICE: AMERICAN JEWS
AND THE FIGHT FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES 1-78 (1997). Consequently, the movement shifted tactics
from countering adult ignorance about minority groups to changing child rearing and education
practices as a way to raise future generations free from the traits of racial and ethnic hatred. An
allied law refOrm movement argued that legal change cannot await the spread of enlightened
attitudes, for law reform can help to promote precisely such enlightenment. See id. at 79-112.
Current social science research supports the idea that law can influence social norms, which in
turn shape personalities. See CASS SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE. 32-69 (1997)
(on social norms and law); SVONKIN, supra, at 84-86 (legal change is a prerequisite to changing
bigotry). Therefore, law should have a role in reshaping racist character. The ADL's current
anti-hate crimes program may represent precisely this fusion of insights from the 1950s manifes-
tation of the intergroup relations educational movement with those of its allied law reform
variant.
27 See suprn notes 17-21 and accompanying text (defining "evil"). I do not want to suggest
that racial conflict and subordination are purely a matter of individual prejudice or isolated acts
by deviant individuals. To the contrary, institutional and unconscious racism are two major
modern causes of racial discrimination. See generally JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND
REASONABLE RACISM (1997).
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tend (with some qualifications) to violence motivated by other group-
based animus (such as sexism or homophobia) and, perhaps with
somewhat less force, to certain nonviolent crimes. Perhaps more im-
portantly, the critics of hate crimes legislation enthusiastically extend
their critique to racial violence. According to Professors Jacobs and
Potter, "[1] t makes no sense to call a prejudice-motivated murder or
rape 'worse' than an otherwise-motivated murder and rape."28 It is this
conclusion that I find most troubling, and demonstrating its error is
my primary goal.
Part I defines individualized justice as recognizing the deep-seated
human need, reflected in our criminal laws and procedures, to be
judged based on our own unique thoughts, feelings, actions, character,
and situation. Hate crimes stifle this need in two ways: by treating
victims as mere representatives of a group; and by humiliating that part
of our unique nature that is rooted in our particular nexus of intimate
group connections. Part. I argues that a central purpose of the criminal
law is to address the resentment and indignation that society in gen-
eral, and victims in particular, feel from the specific way in which an
offender has degraded his prey. Hate crimes legislation is needed
because it condemns the particular way in which the victims have been
humiliated—the damage to their sense that they are ,judged for who
they uniquely arc. Part I further explains that the damage done stems
from a racist personality, one particularly culpable for its misdeeds and
particularly dangerous to further victims.
Part II argues that the messages sent in hate crimes contribute in
a profound way to a racist culture. This racist culture damages the
status of culturally salient groups, an injury in itself but also one that
reduces that group's access to political and social power and to various
material and social resources. Hate messages also raise the risk of
additional physical harms, such as future assaults, and the mere exist-
ence of that heightened risk is morally relevant, even if such harm
never occurs. Part II explains that the offender's culpability for group
status harms and for a heightened risk of future individual assaults
stems from his racist personality. It is the violent expression of the racist
attitudes at the core of his being, not violence per se, that causes these
harms.
28 JAcous & Porn:se supra note 1, at 149. I do not pretend to address every objection to hate
crimes legislation that Jacobs and Potter raise in their book-length treanuent of this subject. My
three central points, however, are ones they do not raise, and which, I argue, outline interests
that outweigh any even arguable countervailing considerations.
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Part III examines the antebellum conflict between Southern pro-
slavery and various Northern abolitionist, emancipationist, and anti-
slavery ideologies. Part III concludes that, especially by the time of
the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption, the conflicting Northern and
Southern views on slavery reflected differing philosophies on the de-
sirable character of free republican citizens. In particular, Northerners
condemned what they perceived to be a cruel Southern character, ever
ready to engage in racially-motivated violence. To Northerners, such a
character was inconsistent with the operation of a free republican
government. The Fourteenth Amendment, Part III argues, was de-
signed in part to battle this danger to our polity, a danger that can be
averted only by legislative, as opposed to judicial, action.
Part IV argues that for a multicultural society to remain coherent,
it must not tolerate remnants of the master-slave relationship, and it
must treat its citizens decently. Racial violence is the defining feature
of slavery. "Decency" ;means that social institutions neither humiliate
nor tolerate the humiliation of citizens by treating them, and the
groups to which they belong, as unwelcome in the family of man. Hate
crimes legislation challenges the racial violence at slavery's heart and
sends the message that all citizens will be treated decently. In this way,
hate crimes legislation promotes unity among racial and ethnic groups.
Critics of hate crimes legislation are therefore wrong to contend that
it promotes divisive identity politics.
I. INDIVIDUALIZED JUSTICE
Individualized justice is a deeply ingrained concept in our crimi-
nal jurisprudence." It respects each person's particular character and
circumstances." It demands that each individual be "treated as unique,
a 'universe of one."' Accordingly, individualized justice rejects clas-
29 See, e.g., Doriane Lanthelet Coleman, Individualizinglustire Through Multiculturalism: The
Liberals' Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. Ray. 1093,1114-18 (1996); Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 15,
at 14-30.
i° See Coleman, .supra note 29, at 1114-15 & mi. 110-14 (collecting cases stressing a focus
on particularized character and circumstances as at the heart of individualized justice); Taslitz,
Myself Alone, supra note 15, at 20-24 (summarizing moral bases for the doctrine of individualized
justice); see alsojEFFRIE C. MURPHY Se JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION
TO JURISPRUDENCE 128 (1990) ("justice demands individuation .... And it seems elemental that
there is a significant moral difference between a person who kills maliciously and one who kills
accidentally . . .").
31 TaSlitl, Myself Alone, supra note 15, at 4 (quoting DONALD SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRAC-
TITIONER: l'IOLV PROFESSIONALS THINK IN ACTION 108 (1983)).
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sification of others as a stereotype, a mere member of a category," 2
because this method of judging rejects the belief that each human life
is of infinite, irreplaceable value."
What makes each person unique includes his or her special
thoughts, feelings, character, and situation." A battered woman may
experience fear of a quality and intensity others cannot understand
without knowing her personality traits, economic pressures, and his-
tory of brutal treatment"' Similarly, it is not enough to know that
someone grieves over the loss of a loved one. The pain of euthanizing
one's elderly dog differs from that caused by the death of one's child.""
Further, the pain of that child's death, for example, may differ based
upon whether the child was an infant or an adult, close to you or long
estranged."
Courts' most explicit recognition of the need for individualized
justice occurs at sentencing; indeed, the concept is elevated to a con-
stitutional mandate in the death penalty context.'" To a lesser extent,
32 SeeTaslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 15, at 18-20 (how typification in criminal adjudication
undermines our cultural aspirations to individualized justice).
33 See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY or 1-Awymes' ETitics 180
(1998) (individualized treatment is essential to human dignity); see also Michael J. Meyer, Intro-
duction, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIIIIITS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES I, 7 (Michael
J. Meyer and William A. Parent eds., 1992) ("llIndividuals have a unique worth and standing
vis-a-vis the state, and, in addition, all individuals should enjoy equal public standings, at least
insofar as they occult) , the role of citizen...),
This concept is rooted iii Judeo-Christian ethics. See JACOB NEUSNER, A Snowy HisToity
JUDAISM: THREE MEALS, THREE EPOCHS 11-12 (1992) (defining "Mislma"). The Mislitta, a com-
pilation of Jewish oral law, p u t it this way:
If a human being stamps several coins with the same die, they all resemble one
another, but the King of Kings of Kings, the Holy One, praised he he, stamps all
human beings with the die of the first man [Adam]; and yet not one of them is
identical with another.
Therefore every individual is obliged to say, "For my sake was the world created."
M1SIINA, Sanhedrin 4:5; see alsoRA RBI JOSEPH TELDSHKIN, JEWISH WISDOM: ETHICAL, SPIRITUAL,
AND HISTORICAL LESSONS FROM Tin: GREAT WORKS AND THINKERS 88-90 (199,1) (reviewing
various Jewish teachings on human uniqueness and value of each 	 For one Christian view of
individualized justice, see Thomas L. Shaffer, Human Nature and Moral Responsibility in Lawyer ,
Client Relationships, 40 Ast. J. JuRts. 1, 2 (1995) ("Justice James Wilson silted ... his own
Calvinist Christian ideal, when he said that, even if the state (the law) is the noblest work of
humanity, the person is 'the noblest work of God'—infinitely valuable, relentlessly
unique, endlessly interesting.") (111101hig in part Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 4 19, 462-63
(1792)).
34 See Paslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 15, at 6-34.
35 See Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Approach to Social Scientific Evidence: Foundations, 5 Mtc.n.
J. GENDER & L. 1, 44-46 (1098).
36 Cf. id. at 19-20 & ii.79 (oil the nature &emotions); Taslitz, Two Concepts, .supra note I I,
at 9-12 (role of the emotions in criminal law).
37 See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 23, at 285-300 (offering similar examples).
38 See Coleman, supra note' 9, at 1114-18 (summarizing law).
748	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 (Vol. 40:739
courts have also implicitly recognized the importance of individualized
justice throughout the criminal trial process," as the battered woman
syndrome—used at trial, not only at Sentencing—illustrates."
The need for individualized justice has deep psychological roots
and is felt by everyone in our culture. Philosopher William James ex-
plained that "any object that is infinitely important to us and awakens
our devotion feels to us also as if it must be sui generis and unique." U 1
In addition to the psychological research supporting the widespread
need for each of us to be viewed as sui generis,42
 our constitutional and
statutory law reflect a similar recognition of the importance of indi-
vidualized justice to rill persons, not only criminal defendants. Thus,
the Fourth Amendment seeks to protect both the innocent and the
guilty,43
 shielding "privacy [that] enable[s] the individual to constitute
himself as the unique person he is," 41
 an aspect of the "fully realized
life" and a "condition .. for the realization of the common good." 45
The Victims' Rights Movement can also be viewed, in part, as an effort
to extend the principle of individualized justice to crime victims in
addition to criminal defendants.4° That movement has sought to give
victims a voice for their particularized pain. 47
 Victims do not want
39
 See Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 15, at 1-30.
4° See 1 DAVID FAIGMAN, ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY §§ 8-1.0-,5, at 319-50 (1997) (summarizing uses of and state of the law
concerning battered women's syndrome).
41
 WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 29-30 (1978). He continues:
"Probably a crab would be filled with a sense of personal outrage if it could (tear us class it without
ado or apology as a crustacean arid thus dispose of it. 'I am no such thing,' it would say; 'I am
MYSELF, MYSELF alone.'" Id.
42 See Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 15, at 14-17 (summarizing research); see also NORMAN
J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS .
 NOTIONS OF THE LAW 286-92 (1995) (jurors concerns
with particularized, both temporally and geographically broad, inquiries into a criminal defen-
dant's character and circumstances are "commonplace and widespread.")
43
 See ANDREW E. TAsurz & MARGARET L. PARIS, CONSTITUTIONAL. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
95-97,150-56 (1997) (summarizing Fourth Amendment's purposes).
4r
	 L. Weinreb, The Fourth Amendment Today, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL
MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 181,185-86 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. ed., 1991).
-13 Id.
46
 See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A CASEBOOK 7-33 (1998);
NATIONAL VICTIM CENTER, STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS:
IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT ON CRIME VICTIMS-SUB-REPORT: CRIME VICTIM RESPONSES RE-
GARDING VICTIMS' RIGIITS (APR. 15, 1997); Laurence Tribe, The Amendment Could Protect Basic
Rights, HARv. L. BULL., Smuttier 1997, at 19,20 ("Pursuing and punishing criminals makes little
sense unless society does so in a manner that fully respects the rights of their victims to be
accorded dignity and respect ... and ... a meaningful opportunity to observe, and take part in,
all .. [relevant] proceedings.").
47 See, e.g., BELOOF, SUM/ note 46, at 464 ('The victim's interests in participating in the plea
bargaining process are many. The fact that they are consulted and listened to provides them with
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judges to enact standard sentences that accompany, for example, a
"typical" robbery. The victims want the judge to know their sleepless
nights, restless fears, precise financial costs, and their children's wor-
ries.'" Victim impact statements, victim interviews in pre-se ► tence re-
ports, notification requirements about hearings and release dates, res-
titution orders, and the right to speak at sentencing are developments
that enable victims to be treated as more than mere statistics or cate-
gorics. 49
Comprehending the underlying retributive emotions perhaps
makes this clearer." All retributive emotions protest against the
offender's despised theory of human worth. 51 We resent moral
injuries to us because they are also messages saying that we count less
respect and an acknowledgment that they are the harmed individual, This in turn may contribute
to the psychological healing of the vieHUI.")
48 Victims' Rights Amendment: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,105th Cong.
(1998) (statement of Paul G. Cassell, Professor of Law, University of Utah College of Law)
("Victims have found that making statements at sentencing brings a sense of healing mid closure."
One victim of a sex crime explained this concept (Wilier' l lead Ellie victim impact statement],
it healed a part of tne—to speak to Elite defendant] and tell him how ranch he him me.'").
49 See, e.g., id. at 1-35 (cataloging and justifying many of these proposed and existing victims'
rights provisions); Karyn Ellen Polito, The Rights of Crimea. Victims in the. Criminal fitstire System:
Isfustice Blind to the Victims of Crime? 16 NEw ENG. J. ON CR1M. & Crv. CONFINEMENT 241 (1990)
(similar). I have argued elsewhere for die importance of the victim's voice and equality of
treatment with the defense in the specific context of rape cases. Sec ANDREW E. TAstrrz, RAPE
AND 'HIE CULTURE 01 ,"ITIE COURTROOM (forthcoming 1999) [iereinaller RAPE AND THE COURT-
ROOM]. Thai I endorse some aspects of the Victims' Rights Movement does not mean, however,
that I endorse all its aspects—some of which gut inqiurtant procedural protections for defen-
dants—nor that I see a federal constitinimial amendment as the wisest way to handle the problem.
See generally Robert P. Mosteller, Victims' Rights and the United Slates Constitution: An Effort to
Recast the Battle in Criminal Litigation, 85 CEo. LJ. 1691 (1997). On the other hand, existing
statutes dealing with the protection olvictime rights are sometimes being employed in a discrimi-
natory fashion—members of racial minorities in practice get less protection than other crime
victims—highlighting the difficulty of subordinated group members to mud]] an adequate voice
in the .jusdee system. See NATIONAL VICTIM CENTER, STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PRO-
TECTION OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT ON CRIME Tic-rims—Suit-RE-
PORT; COMPARISON OF WHITE AND NON-WHITE CRIME VICTIM RESPONSES REGARDING Vic-
RiGHTS (June 5, 1997).
in My analysis of the retributive emotions draws heavily Oil jr,Fram C. MURPHY & JEAN
HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY (1988), as seen through the lens of the theory of individu-
alized justice articulated here. Murphy and Hampton stritcture their book as an exchange. While
they disagree . on a number of points, they agree on most central matters, and I treat their voices
as one, except where otherwise indicated. Some of their disagreements are over terminology
more than substance, and, where that is so, I have adopted Hampton's nomenclature. To the
extent that readers sec substantive differences between their two positions that are relevant heir,
I should be seen (unless otherwise noted) as siding with Hampton's side of the exchange.
Murphy's later writings, however, largely support my position. See infra notes 78-81 and accom-
panying text. For a more detailed summary of this work for other purposes, see Taslitz, Two
Concepts, supra note 11, al 1 0-1 1,
ri SeeTaslitz, Two Concepts, supra note 11, at 08-74,
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than the other; they insult and degrade us and therefore harm our
self-respect.'=' Indeed, the fear that we are less than the other combines
with our insistence that we are not to give resentment its special
emotional flavor." Rut there is another emotion—being "indignant,"
rather than resentful—that we feel when we lack fear that the offender
is right to treat us as less worthy than he, but we protest against the
degrading treatment nonetheless." We can also be indignant about
wrongs clone to others, and it is therefore the term "indignant" that
best describes society's reaction to crime." We seek to reject the of-
fender's message that his victim is of inferior value via the only effective
punishment, the defeat of the offender by his victim or her symbolic
agent."
Indignation is also often accompanied by moral hatred, an "aver-
sion to the insulter herself—her character, her habits, her disposition,
or the whole of her" because she is taken "to be thoroughly identified
with that cause."57 That hatred must he expressed by society, because
"how society reacts to one's victimization can be seen by one as an
indication of how valuable society takes one to be, which in turn can
be viewed as an indication of how valuable one really is."58 Indeed, one
hallmark of a racist society, I will argue, is its justice system's unwilling-
ness to protest against the racially subordinating messages inherent in
certain crimes." Accordingly, satisfaction of our retributive emotions
toward hate crimes requires the condemnation of the racist personality.
It is important to understand that defeat of the offender's specific
cause is what matters.'" It is not enough simply to punish an offender,
52 See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 50, at 24-25.
511 See id. at 50-60.
54 See id. at 54-60.
r'r' See id.
56 See id. at 124-34.
57
 MURPHY & HAMPTON, Stfpra note 50, at 80.
Id. at 141.
" See infra notes 98-286 and accompanying text.
6° Hampton put it this way:
To inflict on a wrongdoer something comparable to what he inflicted on the victim
is to master him in Me way that he mastered the victim. The score is even. Whatever
mastery he can claim, she can also claim. If her victimization is taken as evidence
of her inferiority relative to the wrongdoer, then his defeat at her hands negates
that evidence. Hence the Its talionis calls for a wrongdoer to be subjugated in a way
that symbolizes his being the victim's equal. The punishment is a second act of
mastery that denies the lordship asserted in the first act of mastery.
MURPHY & HARIPTON, Stipia note 50, at 128 (emphasis added). My argument here is that simply
punishing the hate criminal is not subjugation "in a way that symbolizes his being the victim's
equal." Id. Only punishment that expressly condemns his hateful racist message and the ',rein-
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or even to punish him in some general sense for what he has clone.
Rather, we must punish him in a way that rejects the intolerable
messages sent by his conduct."' Abner Louima, for example, was wrong-
fully arrested by New York City police officers who brutally sodomized
him with a nightstick." 2 The conduct was revolting in itself, but it
became a cause celare because both Louima and the black commu-
nity viewed it as a racially-motivated tritne. 6's While punishing the police
officers for assault certainly addresses an aspect of the need for retri-
diced character from which it sprang "master[s] him in the way that he mastered the victim," Id.
Rejecting the racism in the offender is central to creating proportionality between the crime and
its punishment.
Jeffrie Murphy, in a later article specifically concerning hate crimes, expressed sonic
uncertainty about whether they are indeed more deserving of retribution than other violent
crimes. At the same time, however, he marshalled convincing arguments that hate crimes are
indeed worse. See Murphy, supra note 4, at 20, 22. Murphy's article is discussed in more detail
infra notes 75-77, 91,94 and accompanying text.
62 See, e.g., Tom Hays, Indictment Charges Police with Bias in. Tartan! Case—Mistaken Identity
May Have Led to Assault, RECORD, (Northern N.J. ed), Aug. 22, 1997, at A4 ("Volpe and Schwarz
[mo police officers] had already been indicted on charges of aggravated sexual 111311SC and
first-degree assault based on evidence they allegedly sodomized Louima in the station house
bathroom with a wooden plunger handle. The new indictment [on charges of second-degree
assault] alleges that the sex attack also was based on race."). The Louinta beating allegedly arose
out of a melee at a Brooklyn night club in which Volpe mistook Louinta Fur another man who
had sticker-punched the officer during the chaos. See id. Louinia told investigators that the four
officers involved "repeatedly called him 'nigger' throughout his ordeal," resulting in the addi-
tional state second-degree aggravated harassment charge, a misdemeanor committed by striking
or physical contact with another because of race color, religion, or national origin. Id. The case
"unleashed new accusations of police miscondtict, and a Federal investigation into a possible
pattern of brutality in iniuolio, neighborhoods." Id. Various newspapers reported that indictments
came down because of charges that the attack was motivated by racism. See, e.g., Toni Hays, Grand
Jury Alleges Race Was, Motive for Torture Attack by N. E Cops New Indictment Charges Officer Hit
Immigrant Over and Over During the Drive to 70th Precinct, STAR-LEDGER, (Newark, N.J.), Aug.
22, 1997, al 006. The State prosecution was ultimately dropped when the officers were indicted
on Federal Civil Rights charges. See Indictments in Louima Case, NPR's Morning Edition, Feb. 27,
1998, Transcript #98022793-2.10. Louima has also filed a civil rights snit for tort damages. See New
York Brutality Victim. Sues Police Department and Union, LIABILITY Wx. Aug. 10, 1998, The case
spawned a tremendous outcry among anti-racism groups and the African-Atnerican community.
See, e.g., Ronald Powers, Protestors Rally in Washington Against Police Brutality, AP, Sept. 12, 1997
(describing a protest. march outside the Justice Department in which Ron Daniels, director of
the New York-based Center for Constitutional Rights said, 'Elie case of Abner Louirna is not some
heinous aberration ... It is systematic of a glowing epidemic of police brutality and misconduct
which is afflicting communities of color and poor communities across this nation."); Fallen,
VILLAGE VOICE, Feb, 17, 1998, at 41 ("Mlle phrase 'Giuliani time'. . . . became a rallying cry for
African American and Haitian community leaders as well as Gildiani'S mayoral opponents, who
blamed Giuliani for causing a deep racial rift, resulting in the brutalization of Louinia,"). The
officers have not been tried yet, although, as of the date of this writing, jury selection has begun
on the criminal charges. See The Smoking Gun, The Abner Louima Torture Case (visited Apr. A,
1999) Chtipt//www.the smokinggtin.com/tortutO/torttare.slitml >,
63 See supra note 62 and accompanying text..
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bution, complete societal satisfaction of the retributive need requires
that the related convictions and punishment be viewed as at least partly
done because Louima was targeted based on his race.
A racially-motivated assault breaches norms of individualized jus-
tice in important ways. Notably, the victim, such as Louima, is treated
as merely a representative of a category. The officers judged and
condemned Louima's entire being based upon the color of his skin.
They ignored his character, hard work, and efforts to make a life for
his family here—the qualities and experiences that made him a unique
human being. He howled in protest against being treated as less than
human, in general, and because his assault was motivated by racial
hatred, in particular.64
Human uniqueness is partly a function of the intersection among
the groups with whom we associate:
[O]ur social identity—our sense of who we are and what we
are is intimately bound up with our group memberships. Are
we male or female? Black or white? Jewish or Christian? Re-
publican or Democrat? Our attitudes, beliefs, and assump-
tions are thus in part shaped by the groups with which we
identify."
When Louima was anally raped with a police baton because he was
viewed as a member of a less-than,fully-human group (i.e., black
males), it was his blackness, in part, that police sought to subdue.
Such denigration of blacks as a group humiliated a core part of
Louima's identity. It`matters not how his physical or emotional pain
compared to someone similarly abused for non-racial reasons. His
righteous indignation cannot be assuaged unless society loudly re-
jects the officers' evil cause—the message of their conduct: that
Louima was unworthy because he was black. Similarly, society's re-
tributive rage cannot, and certainly should not, be cooled without
this recognition. Yet addressing legitimate retributive emotions, in-
cluding moral hatred for those thoroughly identified with repre-
hensible causes, is necessary for social healing. Society can re-estab-
lish a relationship with these offenders, at least the relationship of
civility between strangers, only after their sins have been expiated
by suffering that has satisfactorily expunged their evil cause.`'`'
64 See supra note 62 and accompanying text..
65 Taslitz, Feminist Approach, supra note 35, at 23; see also Andrew E. Taslitz, Abuse Excuses
and the Logic and Politics of Expert Relevance, 49 HASTINGS U. 1039 (1998) (extended analysis
of a hypothetical illustrating how group affiliations are at the core of self-identity).
,e, See MURPHY & 1-1Amyront, supra note 50, at 36-37,83-86. I recognize that the allegations
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Such expiation necessarily involves rejecting not only the often-
der's cause but the offender himself. This point is made clearer by
examining the nature of "motive." One common challenge to hate
crimes laws is that they punish motives, and motives are said by many
commentators to be irrelevant under Anglo-American law.t' 7 Our crimi-
nal laws traditionally inquire into the accused's mental slate by asking,
for example, "did the offender intend to hurt the victim in an assault
case?" But, say these pundits, our laws do not generally inquire into
motive by asking "why did the offender intend to knit the victim—was
it revenge for the victim's deception in a failed business deal, anger at
a perceived slight, or racial hatred?" Commentators who argue that
motive should not play a role in criminal liability intimate that motive
analysis borders on an inquiry into character because it requires de-
tailed information about the actor and an in-depth examination of his
psychological nature."9 These commentators, in other words, claim we
should punish people only for what they do, not who they are. 7"
As a descriptive matter, these critics arc wrong. Motive often plays
a role in criminal liability though it is not labeled as such. Common
law burglary, for example, asks not only whether an offender meant to
against at least one of the officers in the Louhno ease reflect the officer's.belief that lie was
"sucker-pinched" by Louima as a motivating factor in the assault, a matter distinct from any racial
prejudice. The public perception, however, is that racial haired was the primary motivation,
"suckeppunching" being merely a potential trigger. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
r'7 e.g., Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, But Can Wools Increase Your
Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Lows, 39 UCLA L. REV. 333,
333-34 (1991).
68 See. Murphy, supra note 4, at 20 (summarizing hate crimes critics' views on motive);Josnun
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 107 (2d ed. 1995) (defining "motive" as "ulterior
intention").
°9 See SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY, JUDGING EVIL: RETHINKING THE. LAW OF MURDER AND MAN-
SLAUGH•ER 120-24 (1998) (conceding that motive requires a deeper inquiry into i he background
of the defendant's conduct and noting that motive critics see it as requiring deep psychological
insight); Lawrence Crocker, Hate Crimes Statutes: Just? Constitutional? Wise?, 1992/1993 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 485,490 ("The responsibility retributivist will say that the yachtl animus shows that
one is a worse person, but not that what one does is worse.").
70 See Crocker, sn/sm note 69, at 490-94 (apparently conceding that hate crimes are "worse"
than ordinary ones only if the act is worse than Mat of an ordit wry assailant). Crocker argues
Mai hate crimes acts are indeed worse because haters act with some awareness of our history of
racism, thus ratifying that history. Here Crocker lapses into some ambiguity on his pOSi11011
character, but his focus remains on the act as ratifying historical oppressiott: "The worse character
is crystallized into an act that is itself morally worse." Id. at 493; see also DREssLER, supra note 68,
at 70 ("Criminal law should be limited to situations in which injury is seriously ihre.atened, and
not simply 'to purify thoughts and perfect character' . , lelriminal law (should] be exercised
only in response to conduct."). My embrace of a character mondity here does not, however,
require that the hater be aware of any history of racism. The hater's desire to harm another
because of his race is enough to show him to he more culpable, harmful and dangerous than the
ordinary assailant.
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break into a house but why he did so—was it to get out of the cold
(not a burglary) or to commit a felony therein (burglary)? 7 ' While the
legal definition of the crime speaks of a puipose to commit a felony
therein, the substance of the question asked is one of motive. Similarly,
self-defense doctrine turns on motive, asking not only was there a
purpose to kill, but why there was such a purpose—to prevent the
offender's imminent death or serious bodily injury (self-defense) or
some other reason (not self-defense)? 72
 Indeed, motive plays a role in
defining all specific intent crimes, as well as many defenses (such as
insanity, duress, and necessity), and in sentencing. 73
As a normative matter, the critics are also wrong. They are right
to suggest that motive, in effect, makes criminal liability turn on char-
acter. But, character means more than a tendency toward evil thought:
it means a willingness to act on that tendency—a willingness demon-
strated only by our acts." In a fit of anger, many of us have said to
another, "I'm going to kill you," yet we do not commit the act. Professor
jeffrie G. Murphy explains, "Me look to motives not to punish them
as thoughts alone but as evidence of the ultimate character of the
person being punished."75
 He continues:
just because character is relevant to criminal liability, it does
not follow that this is the same as punishing for thoughts alone
or character alone. The law is interested in character-as-re-
vealed-in-actions, not in those aspects of one's character that
one manages to keep under control and never reveal in
behavior. That the law will punish you for revealing your
hateful disposition in hateful actions still allows you to stew
in your own private hatreds all you want. I think this distinc-
tion is nicely respected in the common linguistic tendency to
refer to general passions and dispositions of character as
motives only when they enter into the explanation of behav-
ior. 76
7 ' See DRESSLER, supra note 68, at 351-52 (defining burglary); Murphy, supra note 4, at 21-22.
72 See DRESSLER, supra note 68, at 107; PlusBuRY, supra note 69, at 120-21.
. 73 See DRESSLER, supra note 68, at 107, PILLSBURY, supra note 69, at 120-21. And, of course,
motive is central to distinguishing common law murder from manslaughter, for why an offender
was provoked to kill the victim (for example, by a victim•spouse's adultery) determines whether
to mitigate the homicide. See DRESSLER, supra note 68, at 490-98.
74 See Taslitz, Two Concepts, supra note 11, at 6,9-11.
75 Murphy, supra note 4, at 22.
76 /d. at 23 n.5.
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When we punish a hate criminal, therefore, we do not adequately
repudiate his conduct without also repudiating his character as here
defined—his willingness, as revealed in his wrongly motivated ac-
tions, to harm others because of their group affiliation. In common
parlance, we describe neo-Nazi terrorists as "racists"--a term regis-
tering disapproval of part of their core being—not as misguided
fools making poor choices that send offensive messages. This com-
mon intuition is one that criminal law properly should reflect.
But, critics contend, character assessment is a poor basis upon
which to impose criminal liability. Such is especially true concerning
hate crimes where, for example, there is no evidence that racists are
more culpable, inflict more harm, or are more dangerous than other
similarly situated wrongdoers.'" Again, the critics are wrong. Regarding
culpability, they object that a racist's character is fixed by the time of
his actions. He has no control over it, no choice, and is therefore not
culpable for his actions. 78 As I noted in my introduction, this approach
improperly freezes the action at one point in time: the time of the act.
At an earlier point, however, the racist had the opportunity to change
his character. 7" Contemporary society is filled with critiques of racism,
so the offender must have been, and certainly easily could have been,
aware of them. Moreover, he had the option of socializing with those
of other races, joining a church teaching tolerance, or otherwise acting
to counter his racist nature!'"
These options aside, even if the offender had no such choice, he
should still be held criminally liable. First, those with racist characters
are by definition—because their willingness to inflict harm on those
of other races is at the core of who they are—more dangerous than
non-racists. It is thus the racists that are most in need of deterrence.'"
Second, as Samuel Pillsbury points out, even if determinism is right
and there is no free will, criminal punishment can be justified. 82 Hu-
77
 See id. at 22.
78 See JACOBS & POTTER, .supra 1101e I, at PI.
70 See se/na notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
s° For a fuller development of the theoretical basis for this point, see 'raslitz, Two Concepts,
supra note I I, at 10.
Si For a summary of the utilitarian argument that punishment is justifiable to prevent future
harm even if the actor lacks free will, sec Taslitz, Tim/ Concepts, supra note II, at II. See generallj,
KEKES, septa note 22 (explabting that character moralities do not necessarily turn on free choice).
See also Murphy, supra note 4, at 23 it.6 (stating that mental states matter in criminal law partly
because they detnonstmte the offender's dangerousness, and it is easier to believe that race
haters are generally more dangerous than that they are generally more evil and blameworthy
that t the average assaulter").
82 See PILLSBURY, supra note 69, at 19-33.
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mans are fundamentally symbol-creating, symbol-interpreting crea-
tures.83 The values embodied in our conduct's messages are what. give
our lives meaning. 84 A central value that infuses meaning in modern
Western cultures is that, in some sense, all humans have equal worth. 85
While there may be no free will in the sense of physical causation, we
view actions as chosen when, at the time they happen, they are rational
and uncoerced by immediately present outside forces. 8' Only this view
allows the world to Make sense to us, thereby giving meaning to our
lives.87
 Accordingly, punishment is deserved according to the wrong-
doer's choice to disregard another's value. 88 When victims are harmed
because they are viewed as representatives of a category and not as
unique individuals, their special value is disregarded, and a blow is
struck against the core American ideal that all persons are created
equal. 8" In this sense, a hate criminal is culpable because he is the kind
of person whose rationally chosen actions contribute to robbing the
meaning of both the victim's life and our collective lives as American
citizens."'
The same thing that demonstrates his culpability—the messages
his actions convey about himself and others—also shows the special
nature of his harm. Because humans are symbol-using creatures, the
" See id. at 23-31.
8.1 See id. at 30-31.
es Pillsbury uses the word "autonomy," and later, in the hate crimes context, stresses the idea
that all persons are "created equal." PILLSBURY, supra note 69, at 35, 114. These concepts seem
to boil down to the notion of equal human worth. See generally THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS,
SiOM note 33.
88 See PILLSBURY, supra note 69, at 18-31.
87
 See id.
88 See id. at 33.
89 See id. at 114.
9° Professor Pillsbury adamantly maintains that his theory of criminal culpability is not a
character morality. See id. at 73. He and I do not disagree, however, for he seems to be defining
a character morality as one that broadly judges the whole person, including aspects of his
character unconnected with his criminal acts. See id. Indeed, his moral theory inquires deeply
into the wrongdoer's emotions, attitudes, motives, and predispositions to do harm as revealed by
his actions. See id. at 26, 73, 110-24, 141-60. While he worries that current definitions of homicide
are inconsistent with a focus on what the offender's actions reveal, he has no doubt that hate
crimes meet this standard. See id. at 73, 114-15. His position is clearest in this paragraph:
The line between an act-based and a character-based rule can be difficult to draw,
however. Often it is a distinction more of degree than kind. After all, in order to
assess the act we must pay considerable attention to the actor. We need to know
whether a killer was crazy or sane, whether he killed deliberately or by accident. In
assessing criminal conduct we necessarily assess a human actor, but only as revealed
by the action.
Id. at 73. Thus, although we use different terminology, Pillsbury and I are saying the same thing.
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messages crime victims receive from their offenders are necessarily part
of the harm suffered.'" Professor Murphy explained:
When I am assaulted, part of what hurts me—part of what
constitutes the hurt or injury itself—is in many cases the MO-
live of contempt or hate or simple lack of respect that I see
behind my attacker's conduct. I am hurt not simply because
my body aches but also because I am degraded, insulted, and
humiliated—concepts that cannot even make sense if severed
from all ties with motives."'
Murphy is ambivalent, however, about whether the messages sent by
hate crimes are worse than those stemming from equivalent crimes.
On the one hand, he says, "I think, a message of contempt . . . is
the core evil in racial discrimination . .""" On the other hand, he
notes, "[I] f I wanted to attack hate crimes from the perspective of
motives, ... I would argue that perhaps almost all assaults, whether
racial or not, involve motives of humiliation and are thus evil to the
same degree.'"H Murphy's last speculation ignores, however, the
deep human need to be judged as unique individuals rather than
as stereotypes.. This need is treated with particular contempt by the
hate criminal. Furthermore, as Part II of this Article will demon-
strate, hate crimes send messages that degrade entire groups, not
only individuals, thus making them worse than non-hate assaults." 5
Additionally, as Part III will show, hate crimes send messages that
reject the core of our post-Reconstruction era constitutional cul-
ture, thereby harming our political system as much as the groups
and individuals that the hate criminal despises.""
Finally, hate criminals are more dangerous than ordinary offend-
ers. It is hard to know the likelihood of any individual criminal recidi-
vating. But if a hate criminal commits another criminal offense, it is
likely that his new offense will again be motivated by racial hatred. That
likelihood is high precisely because his racism is a central part of his
character, his willingness to act because of race hatred. Yet his race-ha-
tred-motivated assault will, for all the reasons noted in this Article,
cause more harm than an assault stemming from other motives. In this
CL See Murphy, supra mite 4, at 20,22-23 & n.8.
92 1d. at 22-23.
93
 Id. at 22.
04 Id. at 23.
95 See infra notes 98-152 and accompanying text.
9(3 See infra notes 153-248 and accompanying text.
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sense, therefore, of two similarly situated criminals, the hate criminal
may be fairly described as the more dangerous. 97 Understanding the
full scope of the danger requires us, however, to turn from the harm
that he does to the individual to the damage he inflicts upon groups.
That damage is done by contributing to a racist culture.
II. RACIST CULTURE
By definition, hate crimes are assaults on both the individual and
his group. The assailant defines the individual entirely by his group
membership, and does so to hurl the insult, "I hate the group for which
you stand. The hate criminal's goal, therefore, is to denigrate the
social status of both the individual and his or her group.
A group's status is a valuable good in itself and in its capacity to
garner power. 99
 Social "[s] tatus includes social approval, respect and
admiration for one's style of life."'" Respect is demonstrated through
symbolic activity. 1 ° 1
 Yet this activity is not "merely symbolic." "Mt is the
very currency of having and maintaining .higher and lower status," 1 °2
for status is a kind of social agreement about value. 1 °3
 Groups pursue
status competition with amazing vehemence. They do so because dig-
nity, honor, and moral approval are intrinsically important to most
people and because status brings further advantages. 10" Status fosters a
sense of solidarity as a class, enabling the group to achieve its politi-
cal objectives more effectively.'" . Status reinforces political power, as
did Jim Crow laws, largely by enforcing a system of daily group degra-
dation. 1" Such degradation compelled black deference and helped
Southern whites to retain their hegemony. 1 °7 Status is also correlated
Cf. Crocker, supra note 69, at 491 ("An offender motivated by racial animus !nay well be
of greater future dangerousness than other offenders. The generic character of the hatred
suggests the strong probability of repetition.").
98
 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 124 (1998).
99 See, e.g., KENNETH L. KARST, LAW'S PROMISE, LAW'S EXPRESSION: VISIONS OF POWER IN THE
POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER, AND RELIGION 8-15 (1993) [hereinafter LAW'S PROMISE].
1009 bl Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313,2327 (1997).
Hu See id. at 2327.
1 "2 Id. at 2327-28.
1" See RICHARD L. ABEL, SPEAKING RESPECT, RESPECTING SPEECH 45-124 (1998) (theorizing
and illustrating the struggle of many groups for social acceptance).
104 Balkin, supra note 100, at 2328.
105 See ABEL, Slfpra note 103, at 60.
106
 See id.
197 See also KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CON-
STITUTION 15-27 (1989) [hereinafter BELONGING TO AMERICA] (interpreting Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), as challenging the group stigma inherent in legal segregation);
Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, in MARI
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with greater ease in obtaining jobs, money, and other forms of eco-
nomic empowerment.'" The fostering of high group status is likewise
seen as preserving morality or, at the very least, a particular way of
Although status can inhere in both the individual and the group,
the fate of both are linked.' 11 Decades ago, in Beauharnais v. Illinois,
the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that harm to a group's
status harms its individual members."' There, Beauharnais, the Presi-
dent of the White Circle League, was convicted of violating a criminal
statute prohibiting defaming groups. Bcauharnais was alleged to be
responsible for the distribution of a leaflet urging whites to unite
against blacks. The leaflet stated, persuasion and the need to
prevent the White race from becoming mongrelized by the Negro will
not unite us, then the aggressions ... rapes, robberies, knives, guns
and marijuana of the negro, surely will."" 2 Reauharnais argued that
convicting him for arranging distribution of the leaflet violated his
First Amendment rights to free speech. The Court disagreed:
Long ago this Court recognized that the economic rights of
an individual may depend for the effectiveness of their en-
forcement on rights in the group, even though not formally
corporate, to which he belongs . . . It is not within our
competence to confirm or deny claims of social scientists as
to the dependence of the individual on the position of his
racial or religious group in the community. It would, however,
be arrant dogmatism, quite outside the scope of our authority
in passing on the powers of a State, for us to deny that the
Illinois Legislature may warrantably believe that a man's job
and his educational opportunities and the dignity accorded
him may depend as much on the reputation of the racial and
religious group to which he willy-nilly belongs, as on his own
merits. This being so, we are precluded from saying that
j. MATSUDA, ET A 1„WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, A5SAULTIVE SPEECH, AND TIIE
FIRST AMENDMENT 59 (1993) ("Brawn held that segregated schools were unconstitutional primar-
ily because of the message segregation comeys--the message that Black children are an untouch-
able caste, unfit to be educated with white children.").
108 See, e.g„ ABEL, MOM note 103, at 60: Balkin, supra note 100, at 2328.
108 See Halkin „supra note 100, at 2331,
I" See ABEL, supra note 103, at 59-.60.
111 343 U.S. 250 (1952). I have offered a similar analysis or Beauharnais in RAPE AND THE
CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM, NM for the very different purpose of exploring its implications
for our evidentiary practices at rape trials. See TASILITZ„ supra note 49.
112 Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 252.
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speech concededly punishable when immediately directed at
individuals cannot be outlawed if directed at groups with
whose position and esteem in society the affiliated individual
may be inextricably involved. 113
Although Beauharnais' authority as First Amendment precedent has
been challenged, the "claims of social scientists" to which the Court
acceded are beyond serious dispute: if a group's status is devalued,
the individual members of that group suffer as well."'
The chain of causation works the other way too: harm to the
individual harms the group. Groups are defined both by their mem-
bers' self concepts and by how others define the group." 5 In particular,
a subordinate group's identity can inhere in the eyes of an oppressor
group."' When an individual member of a subordinate group is seen
as behaving in a fashion meriting low status, his misbehavior is seen as
"typical" of the group, and his degradation adds to that directed to-
wards the group as a whole."' As the next Part of this Article will
discuss, toleration of racial violence directed at individuals because
of their group membership is among our culture's most powerful
badges of inferior status. Correspondingly, legislative action condemn-
ing group-directed violence serves a powerful symbolic function in
asserting the subordinated group's equal status with the dominant
group. "Because the state imprimatur constitutes a public, official
affirmation of norms and values, 'seemingly ceremonial or ritual acts
are often of great importance' and 'the legislative victory, whatever its
factual consequence, confers respect and approval.'"" 8 But legislative
victory alone is not enough. Each criminal prosecution of a violent
hate crime serves a particularly important function in furthering mi-
nority groups' social position in light of the criminal justice system's
"3 1d. at 262-63.
114 Id .,
 see, e.g., RUPERT BROWN, PREJUDICE: ITS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 147-49,176-85,242-45
(1995); LARRY MAY, THE MORALITY OF GROUPS: COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY, GROUP-BASED
HARM, AND CORPORATE RIGIITS 2-4,112-20,135-44 (1987) [hereinafter MORALITY OF CRouRs]
(philosophers' argument, drawing on social science data); see also KARST, LAW'S PROMISE, supra
note 99, at 1-30,67-11 (similar argument, drawing on history and political theory).
115 See MAY, MORALITY OF GROUPS, Supra note 114, at 2-30, 73-81, 112-49; LARRY MAY, THE
SOCIALLY RESPONSIVE SELF: SOCIAL THEORY AND PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 33-37 (1996).
IL° See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
117 See, e.g., DEBORAH TANNEN, TALKING FROM 9 TO 5: How WOMEN'S AND MEN'S CONVERSA-
TIONAL STYLES AFFECT WHo GE'L'S HEARD, WHO GETS CREDIT AND WHAT GETS DONE AT WORK
(1994) (explaining how Language, demeanor, and gender-related stylistic differences affect female
advancement in the workplace).
n8 ABEL, supra note 103, at 61 (quoting in part JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE:
STATUS POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT 11, 23 (1963)).
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unique role as moral educator. Professor Richard Abel put it this
way: "By officially proclaiming transgression of our weightiest norms,
criminal accusations and convictions can profoundly influence racial
status."" 9
Hate crimes legislation thus helps to dismantle group-based status
hierarchies that are inconsistent with the egalitarian spirit of our mod-
ern constitutional culture.u" A similar objection has long been made
by feminists who challenge our "rape culture." 121 According to Emilie
Buchwald, a rape culture "is a complex of beliefs that encourage male
sexual aggression and supports violence against women. It, is a society
where violence is seen as sexy and sexuality as violent." 122 A significant
number of surveys reveal that nearly one-half of all men admit they
would commit rape if they thought they could get away with it.' 2"
Moreover, the most common motivation for date rape is the prestige
young men achieve among their peers for frequent sex, whether con-
sensual or not. 124 Other rapists confess their desire to assert dominance
or control over, or revenge upon, wornen. 125 Rapists' motives thus
119 Id. at 97.
129 See infra Part III. Professor Baikin powerfully makes a similar point:
But Ilse Constitution does more than simply provide fair ground roles for cultural
struggle. It also actively intervenes in some status hierarchies and requires that they
be dismantled, or at the very least, that the support of la ir be withdrawn from them.
The Constitution has an egalitarian demand, a demand which is more than a
demand for equality of rights, and inore than a demand for equality of political
rights. It is a demand for equality of social status . .. This egalitarian demand is
what connects the Constitution to our founding document, the Declaration of
independence. It is the deep meaning of the American political experience. It is
the soul of our Constitution.
Balkh], supra note 100, at 2343-44.
121 Emilie BiiChwilld, et al., Preamble,	 TRANSFORMING A RAPE CULTURE vii
•ald, et al., eds., 1993).
1221d .
123 See, e.g., James V.P. Check & Neil M. i1lalainuth, Sex Role Stereotyping and Readions to
Depictions of Stranger Versus Acquaintance Rape, 45 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 344-56 (1983); Neil
Malimmth & James V.P. Check, Sexual Arousal to Rape and Consenting Depictions: The Importance
of the Woman's Arousal, 89 J. ABNORMAL Psvc0oL. 763-66 (1980); Neil Makunitth, Maggie Heim
& Seymour Feshbach, Sexual Responsiveness of College Students to Rape Depictions: Inhibitory and
Disinhihitory Effras, 38 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 399-408 (1980); Todd Tieger, Sri:Mated Likeli-
hood of Raping and the Social Perception of Rape, 151 RES. PERSONALITY 147-58 (1981). Even in
one study that found only a small percentage of the men admitting to a willingness to rape if'
there were no chance of being caught, over half the men said woolen menu "yes" when they say
"no." See Crystal S. Mills & Barbara J. Granoff, Date and Acquaintance. Rape Among a Sample of
College Students, 37 Soc. WORK 504, 506 (1992). This last observation shows a striking male
willingness to redefine male sexual aggression as non-rape.
121 See Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape and Shame 1-30 (draft manttscript•on file with author)
(summarizing research).
125 See, e.g., Diane Scully & Joseph Marolla, "Riding the Bull at Gilley's": Convicted Rapists
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reflect widespread, common views among many men that sexual ag-
gression, to the point of emotional terrorism or even violence, is a
mark of masculinity. 126
Moreover, the fear of rape leads many women to dress modestly,
'avoid public spaces at night without the company of a man, and gen-
erally seek male protection.P27 This limits women's freedom of move-
ment and expression, inducing them to comply with patriarchal stand-
ards for proper behavior.' 28 But, "[w] henever one group is made to feel
dependent on another group, and this dependency is not reciprocal,
then there is a strong comparative benefit to the group that is not in
the dependent position." 129 A dependent group is seen as weaker and,
therefore, of less value. 13" Because a rape culture makes women de-
pendent on men for protection, but not vice-versa, women conic to be
seen as weaker and less worthy than men. "Rape culture" thus consists
of a climate, a freelyexpressed set of attitudes that fosters subordinate
female social status.
Philosopher Larry May has explained how holding and expressing
such group-subordinating attitudes itself imposes some measure of
moral responsibility on the offending speakers. A man who discusses
women as "Other" promotes more prevalent, more deeply entrenched
views of women as lesser beings."' Similarly, the expression of racist
attitudes creates a sense of solidarity with those of similar mind.' 32 As
feelings of another group's lower value become more shared and more
intense, the greater becomes the risk that others sharing those atti-
tudes will act on them to cause harm.'" Accordingly, sexist and racist
speech further promote stereotypes that help to justify such harm."4
Describe the Revards of Rape, in RAPE AND SOCIETY, READINGS ON THE PROBLEM OF SEXUAL
ASSAULT 58-72 (Patricia Searles & Ronald" Berger, eds., 1995).
118 See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories 1: Cultural Rape Narratives in the Courtroom,
5 S. CAI.. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 387, 448-53 (1996).
t:7 See id. at 394-400.
128 See id. at 394-433.
129
 LARRY MAY, MASCULINITY & MORALITY 94 (1998).
I" See id. at 63-74. This idea has deep mots in American culture. See id.
131 See id. at 63-74, 92-94. May also notes "Mt is the prevalent perception of women as 'other'
by men in our culture which fuels the prevalence of rape in American society." Id. at 93.
Furthermore, "[biodi the 'climate' that encourages rape and the `socialization' patterns that
instill negative attitudes about women are difficult to understand or assess when one focuses on
the isolated individual rapist. There are significant social dimensions to rape which are best
understood as group oriented." Id. at 83.
132 See LARRY MAY, SHARING RESPONSIBILITY 46-54, 79-94, 150-61 (1992).
133 See id. at 1-54; MAY, MASCULINITY AND MORALITY, supra note 129, 63-74.
134 See MAY, SHARING RESPONSIBILITY, SUpra note 132, at 64-68 (stereotyped beliefs retard
the development of sensitivity, a highly valued character trait).
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It is this heightened risk of harm that matters to May; it is irrelevant
that the harm does not conic about. 135 just as a man who shoots into
a crowd to see people scream is lucky if no one is hurt, so is it, for May,
a matter of moral chance if sexist or racist speech does not result in
rape, lynching, or lesser harms.':" 1 The sexist or racist speaker is thus
morally culpable for the expression of his offending attitudes, even if
he intends no concrete harm.'" Of course, says May, the speaker is far
less culpable than one who intentionally and directly inflicts harm,'''"
The speaker may merit only shame or guilt, 'as opposed to the full
moral blame that justifies criminal punishment.m But the harm that
the speaker's message imposes—itsi contribution to a sexist or racist
culture, or "climate"m—helps us to understand better the unique
harms done by those, like hate criminals, who combine gender or
racially subordinating messages with the direct, intentional infliction
of concrete harm."'
i" See id. at 42-50.
1511 See id. at 49. May notes:
hey demonstrate ... moral recklessness ....	 person with racist attitudes
is like someone who aims a gun at another person and pulls the trigger but,
unbeknownst to bin, there is no bullet in the chamber. The fact That The gun does
not go off in his hands, but it does go off in the hands of The next person to pull
the nigger, does not eliminate his share in the responsibilhy for the harm. Both
people who act recklessly share responsibility not just for the risk but for the actual
harm.
Id.
1 " See id. at 42-50.
158 See id. at 16,46-47,49-50.
139 See MAY, SHARING RESPONSIBILITY, SUPra BOW 132, at 16,
IluMAY, MASCULINITY AND MORALITY, Wpra MAC 129, at 83,92.
Hi See MAY, SHARING RESPONSIBILITY, Supra note 132, at 16; see also Taslitz, Myself Alone,
supra note 15, at 1-30 (intentional infliction of' harm is most deserving of full moral Name and
crimitud punishment). While the mere expression of racist views does not, therefore, merit
criminal punishment, the intentional infliction of bodily harm motivated by, and involving the
expression of, racial prejudice does. Racially-motivated assaults thus deserve criminal blame lire
the damage done by their message, separate and apart from the inju ry clone by the physical
actions of assault alone, The United States Supreme Court seems implic i tly to have adopted this
view, albeit not in precisely die terms discussed here, in Wisconsin a, Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993),
wh eVc the Court upheld a hate crimes M.:MOW against First Amendment challenge. Among the
Conres justifications for permitting die "singling out" of bias-inspired conduct, apart from other
beliefs or biases, was that such conduct was likely to inflict greater individual and societal harm
than other kinds of conduct. These harms included (1) a greater likelihood of inflicting distinct
emotional harms on the victims and (2) a greater likelihood of inciting community unrest. See
id. at 487-88. While the Court may not have had in mind precisely The harms discussed here, The
teams "distinct emotional harms" and "community unrest" are broad enough to include, or at
least express a sympathy for including, injuries to group status, independence, and security.
Moreover, the Court spoke in terms of a "greater likelihood" of harm, recognizing that a mere
increase in t.lte risk of harm, rather than proof of actual harm, was sufficient. Furthermore, the
Court understood that the especially powerful subordinating message contained in the combina-,
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The subordinate groups' mere perception of an increased risk of
harm may also have unsettling consequences. Sensing greater risks,
minorities may step cautiously to avoid certain neighborhoods and
seek not to offend majorities by "uppity behavior" or the expression of
unpopular views." 2
 These defensive behaviors limit excluded groups'
political, emotional, and social lives, much in the way that feminists see
rape fear as breeding female dependency and a female nature compli-
ant with patriarchal notions of "proper" gendered behavior.'"' Femi-
nists and other critical theorists sense more clearly than May that, even
absent increased risks of harm or the perception of such increased
risks, the expression of racist and sexist attitudes constitutes subordi-
nation in and of itself. Absent such expression, a culture that under-
stands one group as inferior to another could not exist.'"
May also stresses that members of the dominant group who do not
actively challenge such subordinating messages share moral blame for
the bias-motivated harms done by other members of the dominant
group. 145 First, passive tolerators benefit from the harms committed by
other members of their group. For example, kind and compassionate
men who would never dream of committing rape benefit when women
suffer rape fear that makes them more dependent on, and accepting
lion of words with violent deeds was the cause of this increased risk. Finally, the message's content
and mode of expression were intended primarily to inflict harm, rather than to exchange ideas,
dins being more conduct than speech for First Amendment purposes. See id. at 487. For a more
extended discussion of why racially or ethnically discriminatory words or deeds that are harassing
or primarily intended to inflict. harm are more conduct than speech, see Andrew E. Taslitz, &
Sharon Styles Anderson, Still Officers of the Court: Why dm First Amendment Is No Bar to Challenging
Racism, Sexism and Ethnic Bias in the Legal Profession, 9 GEO. 1 LEGAL ETHICS 781,802-11,827-30
(1996). While the present Article does not address First Amendment concerns in hate speech
regulation, this brief excursus demonstrates that reasoning about constitutional principles and
criminal justice policy can and should inform one another. See generally KENT GREENAWALT,
SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE (1989) (justiljing widespread crimitialization of
certain language practices as consistent with both constitutional law and policy wisdom).
142 See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text (describing analogous phenomena for
women gripped by rape fear); Lawrence, supra note 107, at 74. Lawrence states:
There is a great difference between the offensiveness of words that you would rather
not hear ... and the injury inflicted by words that remind the world that you are
fair game for physical attack, that evoke in you all of the millions of cultural lessons
regarding your inferiority that you have so painstakingly repressed, and that imprint
upon you a badge of servitude and subservience for all the world to see.
Id.
143 See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
I " See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS? HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND
THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT (1997) (critical race theorist); CATHARINE A. MAcKiNNoN, ONLY
WORDS (1996) (feminist theorist).
145 See MAY, SHARING RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 132, at 49-50,152-58.
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of, the needs of their male companions."G Sonic active and passive
dominant group members thus share a kind of brotherhood of oppres-
sion) 47 Second, those who mean no harm, do much to cause it. when
they casually express attitudes of mistrust of female competelice or fear
of black males as dangerous. Such prejudices contribute to the climate
of subordination.H 8 Third, and relatedly, many of the passive are in a
position to reduce the risk of harm by challenging hateful messages
yet fail to do so. 149 A society that does not condemn hate crimes in law
and in action makes many of us collaborators creating and perpetuat-
ing rape and racist cultures.
Note, finally, that May stresses the harm caused by our attitudes.''"
Attitudes are predispositions to act that reveal themselves in the con-
junction of our thoughts with our behavior) Only when racial hatred
leads to hateful action can we be said to have a hateful predisposition.
The sum total of our predispositions, however, constitutes our charac-
ter. 2
 For the reasons noted in this Article's introduction, we are each
individually responsible for our character. Therefore, for May, the
group-based harms of a racist culture stein from the same source as
the individual-based harms of stereotyped justice 7—the evils of racist
personality.
Ill. A DESPISED THEORY OF HUMAN WORTH: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT'S ABHORRENCE OF THE RACIST PERSONALITY
J.M. Balkin has noted that the American revolution was social as
well as political)" The founders hoped to create not only a new repub-
lican form of government but a new republican society as well) 51 The
social and political revolutions were linked because citizens of virtue,
who had the ability to put collective interests over personal ones and
1413
	 MAY, MASCULINITY AND MORALITY, supra note 129, at 92-94.
147 See id. at 92-93.
148 See MAY, SHARING RESPONSIBILITY, sUpra note 132, at 15-54; see also MAY , Mortiu,rry OF
GROUPS, SUM note 114, at 135-44; Lawrence, supra note 107, at 74-75.
14`9
	 MAY, MASCULINITY AND MORALITY, ,sUtira note 129, at 92-93; MAY, SHARING RESPON-
sintLiTv, supra note 132, at 49-50,83-05,153-60.
1 t"'See MAY, SHARING RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 132, at 46-50.
' 51 See id. at 46.
1112 See tri, at 15-16,46-50,55-70.
1 ' See Balkin „supra note 100, al 2333.
irPi See id. at 2334; Cf. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 97
(1991) ("Many like Adam Smith believed that all governmenis in the world could he reduced to
just two—monarchies and republics—and these were rooted in two basic types ol personalilies;
monarchists, who loved peace and order, and republicans, who loved liberty and inilepen-
dence.").
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to judge men on merit rather than their birth or social privilege, were
essential to the success of a republic,' 55
 While republican ideas are
often said to have been quickly eclipsed by liberal ones—which value
individual autonomy over collective need' 56—many view citizens of the
early republic as having attempted an uneasy fusion of liberal and
republican thinking.' 57
 This fusion took very different forms, however,
in the flee North and the slaveholding South.m
155
 See Balkin, supranote 100. Balkin explains: "They hoped to substitute a natural aristocracy
of merit for the aristocracy of birth and social privilege. They hoped, in short, to breed a new
sort of person, a republican Citizen, equal to all and subordinate to none." Id. at 2'315. On the
kinds of (masculine) citizen virtues that the founders saw as placing a mail higher or lower in
the aristocracy of merit, see MARK E. KANN, A REPUBLIC OF MEN: THE AMERICAN FOUNDERS,
GENDERED LANGUAGE, AND PATRIARCHAL POLITICS (1998) (describing, in rising order of citizen
merit, "The Family Man," "The Better Sort," and "The Heroic Man").
156 See, e.g., EARL J. HESS, LIBERTY, VIRTUE, AND PROGRESS: NORTHERNERS AND THEIR WAR
FOR THE UNION vii (2d ed. 1997) (noting that "[elven as the nation was being established by the
Founding Fathers, . (t) he republican's emphasis on public virtue as a safeguard of political
liberty and his desire to balance the welfare of society with the urge to accumulate wealth seemed
increasingly naive to many people"). Professors Hirshman and Larson have summarized the
argument that liberalism triumphed as follows:
Historian Cordon Wood has convincingly argued that, as the period of inde-
pendence played out, the commercial and impersonal public world superseded the
virtuous republic, As the fever of revolution began to pass, problems of economic
self-interest and the institutions necessary to fund the national economy moved to
center stage. Norms of public behavior shifted from the republican ideal of the
selfless public servant to the dominant construct of individualistic entities striving
for self-interest and kept in check only by canny constitutional structures.
LINDA R. HIRSIIMAN & JANE E. LARSON, HARD BARGAINS: THE POLITICS OF Sex 72 (1998).
Professors Hibshman and Larson argue, however, that women are now expected to embody, and
to inculcate in their children, private virtues that would make for better citizens. See id. at 72,
79-98,
157 See, e.g., HESS, supra DOW 156, at vii-x (arguing that republican rhetoric played a critical
motivating role for both Northerners and Southerners immediately before, during, and immedi-
ately alter the Civil War); DONALD S. LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 27,
81-90 (1988) (finindets' theory, ultimately embodied in the Federal Constitution, was that
governmental institutions would reduce the role of the passions, especially the self-interested
ones, thus enabling the public virtue of the American people to shine in the light of slow,
deliberative debate); see also RICHARD D. BROWN, THE STRENGTH OF A PEOPLE: THE IDEA OF AN
INFORMED CITIZENRY IN AMERICA, 1650-1870 (1996) (ideology of an informed citizenry as a
monitor of, and guardian against, governmental abuses played an especially important role in
American history, at least up until adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments). The founders
preferred republican governments over plebiscitarian democratic ones partly because they trust-
ed that the most virtuous should lead. But that belief in an aristocracy of virtue did not mean
that the founders rejected a bedrock faith in the ultimate virtues of the common (albeit white
male) citizen. See, e.g., Lutz, supra, at 85; see generally KANN, supra note 155. But see FORREST
MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL. ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 56-
142, 191-221, 291-92 (1985) (summarizing the many differing views of the founders on virtue
and self interest, but suggesting that they ultimately hailed the Few virtuous "Optimates" as leaders
and Feared the common "Populares," as a race of pygmies come to infest the public councils).
158 For clarity, I often speak here of the views of the "North" and the "South," Of course, no
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Part III examines these differences, revealing that Northern cul-
tural forces motivating adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments
sought to condemn a certain kind of racist personality—one whose
racism justified racial violence. Indeed, the Fourteenth Amendment
was partly directed at protecting newly freed slaves from physical and
economic terrorism. The North, the Reconstruction Congress, and
many of the ratifiers saw racial violence, however, as wrong not only
because of the harmful acts invoked but also because of what those
acts revealed about the offender's unvirtuotts character or, in modern
terms, his racist personality. In the northern view, condemnation of
such deeply flawed character was essential to the health of a republican
polity. The Fourteenth Amendment, Part. III argues, should therefore
be seen as authorizing—indeed encouraging, and perhaps mandat-
ing—Congress and state legislatures to act to reject racist character and
terror. Part III does this by first outlining Southern concepts of virtue
and then contrasting them with the very different Northern concepts.
A, Southern Virtue
In the South, many intellectual apologists came to view slavery as
central to the virtues fundamental to a free republic.'''' Slavery was the
"cornerstone" of the "republican edifice."" It enabled the paradigm
citizen to have the leisure necessary to inform himself about questions
of politics, thus making him less likely to be influenced by (lentil-
single worldview was shared by all citizens of either geographical legion. But out of the diverse
views in each region, there evolved widely shared commonalities, attitudes that beCallIC
lady influential, even dominant. There were always dissenters, st:intelinteS loud and numerous, as
was true of the Northern anti-einancipationist Copperheads and their opponents, the radical
abolitionists, who early demanded slavery's immediate end. Nevertheless, dominant views did
evolve, as Hess wakes clear in his text, on which 1 significantly here rely. See IlEss, supra note
150. Must iinportant (or my purposes are the dominant views or virtue and character during
time or the Fourteenth Amendment's proposal and ratification, views that incorporated many
aspects of the original progressive dissenters' (the abolitionists) insights. See infra !lows 159-231
and accompanying text.
159 See, e.g., GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776-1970, at 212-4(1 (19(97). Alexander notes that
lawyers played a particularly prominent role in constructing pro-slavery ideology, the lawyer-apolo-
gists falling into two camps: (1) the political eCUDOIDIS13, stressing liberal market theory, and
(2) the organic social hierarchists, seeking to limit the market's domination of all social life. See
id. at 211-15. By the 1840s, intellectual leadership had passed to We hierarchists, who relied on
a variant of eighteenth centhry cMc republicaniSni. See id. at 213-15.
11109olm Henry Hammond, Letter to an English Abolitionist, in DREW GILPIN FAINT, THE
IDEOLOGY OF SLAVERY: PROSLAVERY THOUGHT IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH, 1830-1800, at 177
(1981) ("[S]lavery is truly We 'corner-stone' and foundation or every well-designed and durable
'republican edifice.").
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gogues." Moreover, slavery created the conditions for true equality
among citizens, for, said T.R. Cobb, a leading pro-slavery theorist,
"every citizen feels that he belongs to an elevated class. It matters not
that he is no slaveholder; he is not of the inferior race." 162 Cobb
continued, "The poorest meets the richest as an equal; sits at his table
with him; salutes him as a neighbor; . . . and stands on the same social
platform. Hence, there is no war of classes . . . [but true] republican
equality . . ."' 63 Furthermore, by turning labor (the slave) into capital,
the class warfare between labor and capital in the North was avoided.'c4
To their owners, slaves were not simply market commodities, but de-
pendent beings—and uniquely valued capital—who needed a master's
care.'°5
 The organic social hierarchy of slavery thus promoted a sense
of civic and individual obligation to others rather than the unbridled
selfishness of Northern market society. 166
The ideological justification for who should be in the subordinate,
slave class—a class of noncitizens dependent on their masters—was
racism.' 67
 Racism and violence were yoked closely together. Black slaves
L61 See ALEXANDER, supra now 159, at 217; see also THOMAS R.R. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE
LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN 'THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, TO WHICH IS PREFIXED, AN HIS-
TORICAL. SKETCH OF SLAVERS' CXiii (1858) ('The leisure ... gives [the slaveholder] an opportunity
of informing himself upon current questions of politics ... [and thus] not to be influenced to
so great an extent by the 'humbugs' of demagogues.").
162 COBB, .Siipia note 161, at ccxiii.
163 Id.
'f" See ALEXANDER, supra note 159, at 214-15,228-32.
"See id. at 228-32. There were two variants on this theme, one an alchemical one, exem-
plified by Cobb: "By making, the laborer himself capital, (he conflict ceases, and the interests
become identical." Costs, supra note 161, at ccxiv. The other valiant avoided magical language
in favor of a more Overt reliance on the benefits of slaves' dependence on their masters;
At the North, labour and capital are equal; at the South, labour is inferior to
capital. At the North, labour and capital strive; the one, to get all it can; the other,
to give as little as it may—they are enemies. At the South, labour is dependent on
capital, and having ceased to be rivals, they have ceased to be enemies. Can a InOre
violent contrast be imagined?
WILLIAM HENRY TRESCOTT, THE POSITION AND COURSE OF THE SOUTH 10-11 (1850). Slave
dependency was, to Trescott and his brethren, rooted in slaves' natural inferiority, creating an
obligation on the stronger (the master) to cure for the weaker, thus making slavery into a unique
form of property. See ALEXANDER, supra note 159, at 228-32. At the same time, pro-slavery
intellectual thinking was not always internally consistent, recognizing that in practice slaves were
often treated as mere commodities. See id. at 232-40. Pro-slavery thought is thus most accurately
viewed as involving a dialectic between proprietarian (pre-modern, paternalistic) and commod-
ified notions of slaves as property. See id. at 232-40.
"See ALEXANDER, supra note 159, at 232-40.
167 See, e.g., JAMES OAKES, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM: AN INTERPRETATION OF"I'llE OLD SOUTH
128-32 (1990) [hereinafter SLAVERY AND FREEDOM] (only the ideology of racism rooted in the
idea of the inherent biological inferiority of black-skinned Africans had the power to build
support for the peculiar institution among even the many free men who did not own slaves).
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were deemed incapable of self-control, emotionally simple, and intel-
lectually inferior" and consequently "were deemed inherently more
responsive ... to the motivating force of physical coercion ...."' 69 The
slave management literature stressed that "tangible punishments and
rewards, which act at once on their senses, are the only sort most .. .
[slaves] can appreciate." 170 Accordingly, slaves' moral and economic
health, not to mention their political role in permitting true republi-
can citizenship, required teaching them total and unconditional obe-
dience to their master. 17 ' That obedience was similarly linked with race,
as, wrote one planter, they must learn that "to the white face belongs
control, and to the black obedience."172 While some literature coun-
seled persuasion as a technique, no one cited "a single instance of a
slave convinced . [solely] by the sheer force of his master's logic. "' 76
Punishment usually meant whipping, 174 and while the literature often
spoke of "whipping as a last resort; in practice, it was the disciplinary
centerpiece of plantation slavery." 175 One master stated, "[i]f the law
was to forbid whipping altogether the authority of the master would
be at an end." 176 As abolitionism gained ground, combatting it, rather
than promoting plantation efficiency, became the primary goal of the
slave management literature. 177 Management experts started to recom-
mend "increased repression on paternalistic grounds. 'Slaves have no
respect or affection for a master who indulges them over much." 178
"'See id. at 130.
169 1d,
1711JAMES OAKES, TOE RULING RACE: A flisTotcy OF AMERICAN SLAVEHOLDERS 154 (1998)
li.ereinafter RULING RACE] (quoting a cotton planter), Although BO single theory justifying
mastevslave relations united the slaveholders, the closest to an ideal to which slaveholders aspired
was the set of prescriptions and attitudes reflected in the plantation management literature that
flourished from the 1830s until the Civil War. See id. at 153.
171 See id. at 154-59.
/72 Id. at 154 (quoting Cotton Planter and Soil of the South, 1 (1852)).
173 /d. at 158.
174 See id. at 159-60.
175 OAKES, RULING RACE, supra note 170, at 167.
17f1 FREDERICK LAW OLMSTED, A jotittNEx IN TIM SEABOARD SLAVE STATES 206,618 (1856).
177 See OAKES, RULING RACE, supra note 170, at 162-64.
178 Id. at 163 (quoting DeBow's Review, XVIII (1854)) (recommendations of planter Robert
Collins). While the ideal plantation portrayed in the management literature was an abstraction
to most large planters, and irrelevant to the majority of slaveholders who owned fewer than ten
bondsmen, the literature is significant for two reasons: (I) it likely portrayed a more humane
pictu re of slavery than was die reality, while it still reeked of racism and violence; and (2) it
painted a picture of Sout hern citizen virtue that fit what became the North's image of the South,
an image that the North viewed with revulsion, certainly by the time of Reconstruction. Compar'e
OAKES, RULING RACE, supra note 170, at 164-69 (discussing the reality of Southern masters'
cruelty and the hypocrisy of those masters who avoided tainting their own hands, while tacitly
cm:out-aging overseers' abuse) with HESS, SUMO note 156 (on North's views on Southern "virtue").
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Early on, Thomas Jefferson worried about the effects on citizen
virtue of teaching, even if only by example, that racial violence was
central to good republican citizenship, 17u for violent abuse of slaves was
their masters' practice long before it was preached by slavery's intel-
lectual apologists and plantation management literature.' 8° Jefferson
stated:
The parent storms, the child looks on, catches the lineaments
of wrath, puts on the same airs in the circle of smaller slaves,
gives a loose to his worst of passions, and thus nursed, edu-
cated, and daily exercised in tyranny cannot but he stamped
by it with odious particularities.... And with what execration
should the statesman be loaded, who permitting one half the
citizens to trample on the rights of the other, transforms those
into despots, and these into enemies, destroys the morals of
the one part, and the amor patriae of the other.""
Jefferson's views in this passage—if not in his heart or in his ac-
tions
—directly contradicted those of the slavery apologists, who had
argued that the violence attendant to slavery was necessary to cre-
ating caring, duty-bound, equal citizens whose rule would benefit a
subordinate black population that could not care for itself.' 82 In
For summaries or how the law supported Southern racial violence against slaves, see generally
RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 29-135 (1997); THOMAS 0. MORRIS, SOUTHERN
SLAVERY AND THE LAW 1619-1860, at 182-248,337-53 (1996); JENNY BOURNE WAHL, THE BONDS-
MAN'S BURDEN: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE COMMON LAW OF SOUTHERN SLAVERY 101-73
(1998).
179 See THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 162-63 (William Peden ed.,
1982) (expressing these views). See generally CHARLES JOHNSON & PATRICIA SMITE!, AFRICANS IN
AMERICA: AMERICA'S JOURNEY THROUGH SLAVERY (1998) (on the long history or racial violence
against slaves).
lwAs noted earlier; the plantation management literature and the literature of the intellec-
tual elite slavery apologists likely painted a more humane picture of slavery than was true in
reality. Nevertheless, theory and reality shared racism and an understanding of the centrality of
the credible threat of the master's violence against the slave to maintain the institution. See supra
notes 167-78 and accompailying text. But racial violence against slaves had a long history
preceding the writing of many of the apologists. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
3 8l JEFFERSON, supra note 179, at 162-63.
182 Wbile Jefferson often wrote oldie evils of slavery, his actions frequently belied his protests.
See PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE; FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE op jurnesor4
105-67 (1996). lie was an enthusiastic racist, believing wholeheartedly in the inferiority of, and
fearing, black•skinned Africans and their descendants. See id. at 107-10,151-53. Moreover, while
he was neither sadistic nor vicious, "for his own slaves ... punishment could be swift, arbitrary,
and horrible." Id. at 110,156. Furthermore, iris racist views and actions arguably lent support to
the idea that white citizen equality rested on the oppression of the black masses. See id. at 107-10.
Nevertheless, Jefferson unquestionably "hated" slavery because it turned whites into tyrants. Id.
at 149. He feared, therefore, that slavery would corrupt white citizen virtue. This fear was a far
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practice, slaveholders also lacked Jefferson's compunctions. indeed,
by the 1850s, public denunciation of lenient slave management
pushed even "kind" masters toward cruelty to he more favorably
regarded by their neighbors.' 88 Blatant, excessive cruelty was rarely
condemned.'" Many masters or overseers reveled in race-based
physical abuse. 185 During this period, the slave Solomon Northrup
recalled being forced by his master to beat another slave while the
mistress "stood on the piazza among her children, gazing on the
scene with an air of heartless' satisfaction."' 8' This prompted
Northrup to ponder "the effect of these exhibitions of brutality on
the household of the slave-holder."'" For instance, Northrup wrote
that his master's oldest son:
is an intelligentlad of ten or twelve years of age. It is pitiable,
sometimes, to see him chastising . Uncle Abram. He will
call the old man to account, and if in his childish judgment
it is necessary, sentence him to a certain number of lashes,
which he proceeds to inflict with much gravity and delibera-
tion. Mounted on his pony, he , often rides into the field with
hiS whip, playing the overseer, greatly to his father's delight.
Without discrimination, at such times, he applies the rawhide,
urging, the slaves forward with shouts, and occasional expres-
sions of profanity, while the old man laughs, and commends
him as a thorough-going boy.'"
It is important to stress again the role of racism in Southern
concepts of virtue, for Southerners saw repression of free blacks as
equally necessary as repression of slaves. 189 Indeed, if free blacks were
cry from abolitionistri, but can be seen as a precursor to the post-Civil Wiw sentiments of many
Northerners, who retained their racism but rejected slavery in part precisely because of its damage
to the white personality. See infra notes 196-231 arid accompanying text. Abolitionists and later
many emancipationists in the North did, however, come to have some concern for the impact of
slavery on blacks. During early Reconstruction, the politically dominant sentiment in the North
was at least to protect blacks from racial violence and economic harassment. See infra notes 213-30
and accompanying text.
1 " See OAKES, RULING RACE, suprn note 170, at 167-68.
I" Site id.
185 See id. at 167-76, 180-83. See genemlly JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & LOREN SCIEWENINGER,
RUNAWAY SLAVES: REBELS ON THE PLANTATION. 42-48 (1999) (documenting physical cruelty
toward slaves by masters and overseers as a common reason for slaves' becoming runaways).
151 SoLomoN NORTHROP, TWELVE YEARS A SLAVE 196, 201 (Site Eakin & Joseph Logsdon,
eds., 1968) (1853).
187 1d. at 201.	 .
188
See OAKES, SLAVERY & FREEDOM, SIIPM note 167, at 133. See generally IRA BERLIN, SLAVES
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to be seen as doing too well, the whole institution of race-based slavery
would be called into questiori.'"° Laws discouraged manumission and
limited the rights of free blacks.R" These limitations were rooted in a
Southern white character whose identity depended on a vision of black
character that was not only naturally inferior and dependent, but also
dangerous.'" T.R. Cobb explained: "[R]emove the restraining and
controlling power of the master, and' the negro becomes, at once, the
slave of his lust, and the victim of his indolence, relapsing, with won-
derful rapidity, into his pristine barbarism."'" Cobb concluded, "Hayti
[sic] and Jamaica," where slaves had successfully revolted, "are living
witnesses to this truth. . . ."'"
While the South thus embraced racial violence as central to virtu-
ous citizen character, the North eventually came to precisely the oppo-
site conclusion. To the North, the love of racial violence came to
represent the essence :of the degraded, unvirtuous Southern character.
For Northerners, citizen virtue ultimately came to be defined as the
opposite of Southern traits. Northerners could not speak of their own
virtue other than by contrasting it in the same breadth with attitudes
and events in the South that Northerners saw as defining an anti-re-
publican character. 145 The next section of this Article thus examines
Northern views of what was wrong with Southern notions of "virtue"
WITHOUT MASTERS: THE FREE NEGRO IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (1974) (documenting South-
ern oppression of free blackS).
190 Oakes notes:
Having justified slavery by resorting to racist ideology, . . . free Southerners were
naturally troubled by the presence of blacks who were not slaves. Rather than adjust
their ideology to conform to the reality of several hundred thousand free blacks,
the slaveholders brought reality itself more into line with their stated convictions.
OAKES, SLAVERY & FREEDOM, supra note 167, at 133.
1" See id. These limitations included exclusion of free blacks from political participation, as
well as restrictions on their freedom of movement, property rights, and economic options. See id.
I". Jefferson seemed to Share this fear; viewing each slave as "[amt animal whose body is at
rest, and who does not reflect... dull, tasteless and anomalous ...."JEFFERSON, supra note 179,
at 138,162. He worried that one day the angry animals would break their pen: "I tremble for my
country when I reflect that. God is just: that his justice cannot sleep forever: that considering
numbers, nature and natural means only, a revolution of the Wheel of fortune, an exchange of
situation, is among possible events: that it 'nay become probable by supernatural interference!"
Id. at 163; see also FINKELMAN, SUPH2 note 182, at 136 (interpreting this passage as showing
Jefferson's fear of slave retribution as well as slavery's harm to republican government).
193 CoBB, supra note 161, at 49 (citations omitted).
194 Id. On the rebellion itr Haiti, then called St. Domingue, see JoHNsotsi & SMITH, supra note
179, at 249-66. On the American response to Jamaican rebellion, to which "the British responded
with an ambitions campaign of emancipation within their colonies," see JAMES BREWER STEWART,
HOLY WARRIORS: THE ABOLITIONISTS AND AMERICAN SLAVERY 43-45 (rev. ed. 1996).
195 Professor Hess explained it this way:
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as the only way to understand the kind of republican citizen character
to which the post-Civil War North aspired.
B. Northern Views of Southern "Virtue"
While Northern and Southern attitudes toward the good life were
more similar than they often cared to admit,'• Northern ideas of
republican virtue came to differ from those of the South in impor-
tant ways. The Civil War reignited Northern republican spirit." 7 Many
Northerners feared the impact of slavery on Southern whites, viewing
. slavery as damaging.white virtue by debasing labor (since it was done
by a despised racial minority); and creating an elite class of slavehold-
ers with a tremendous influence on local, state, and national politics
(especially regarding the spread of slavery to the West)." Slavery bred
a Southern character comfortable with repression of rights—white as
well as black—including suppression of free speech, freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and rights of association in an
effort to silence public debate on the slave question. 1 "" In this manner,
slavery as an institution came to be seen as encouraging traits that
reveled in crushing the freedoms of even free whites. 211) The - North also
saw slavery as inconsistent with its deep belief in the virtue of self-con-
trol, a trait recognized by the Civil War era as especially important to
a free people. 201
 General John Logan, expressing common sentiment,
explained that self-control was necessary to live together "in obedience
to the better instincts of humanity and to repress the selfishness,
While convinced of their own character—as individuals and as a people—North-
erners reversed the image of virtue when pondering the nature of their enemies.
Working within the context of their values, they pictured the Confederacy as the
antithesis of everything associated with their own ideology. They saw justification
for the war upon slavery in the conduct of the Rebel war effort, in the social
attitudes of Southerners, and even in the personal characteristics of individual
Confederates.
HESS, supra note 156, at 78.
155 See, e.g., id. at 16 (noting Southern mainstream shared many Northern attitudes, an
observation unrecognized by the North); OAKES, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM, supra note 167, at 40-79
(demonstrating many shared values between Mirth and South, including especially those char-
acteristic of capitalism).
157 See _Hass, supra note 156, at xiv ("The Civil War was the last great hurrah of republican
ideology ....").
198 Id. at ix-x.
199 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Slaves No More!: The Implications of the Infinmed Citizen Ideal for
Discovery Before Fourth Amendment Suppression Hearings, 15 GA. Sr. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 1999)
[hereinafter Taslitz, Informed Citizen] (summarizing this argument. and relevant sources).
255 See id. at 21-31; 11Ess, supra note 156, at 19-20.
251 See liEss, supra note 156, at 9-10,21.
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avarice, ambition, injustice of the fallen nature [of men]."202 North
erners believed in self-interest too, but argued that an informed self-
interest would lead each citizen to self-control and virtue. 203 Accord-
ingly, serving the common good served the individual as wel1. 2"
Northerners did not see that the Southern mainstream shared
many Northern capitalist values, albeit with a more anti-egalitarian
twist. 2 "5 Instead, the North branded the entire South by the South's
most radical visionaries and read Southern literature selectively, there-
by portraying the war as a battle over national character. 2°6 The South-
ern slaveholding elite, conclUded the North, made the rich indolent
and the common man subservient. 207 "A cringing servility," one North-
ern soldier noted, "must be generated and maintained on the one side
and a haughty and exacting superciliousness on the other."208 Slavery
further bred a Southern character incapable of sell-contro1,2°9 which
meant that Southerners gave free reign to selfishness, ambition, and
brute force. Southerners were characterized by cruel, unmanly treat-
ment of others. The loss of self-control and rise of cruelty were mag-
nified by the common man's ignorance, which made him easily misled
by his leaders. 2 '" The attack on Fort Sumter that began the war was
seen as proof of the violent, ignorant Southern characterP Southern-
ers "had unlearned the art of self-government, and could not be
trusted to maintain control of their passions. "212
Of course, Northerners were mostly racists by modern stand-
ards.213
 But their racism was of a different order, especially after the
2112 JOHN A. LOGAN, THE VOLUNTEER SOLDIER OF AMERICA 376-78 (1887).
202
	 Hess, supra note 156, at 10-11.
204 See id. at 11-12. De Tocqueville put it this way:
In the United States hardly anybody talks of the beauty of virtue, but they maintain
that virtue is useful and prove it every day. The American moralists do not profess
that men ought to sacrifice themselves for their fellow creatures because it is noble
to make such sacrifices, but they boldly aver that such sacrifices are as necessary to
him who imposes them upon himself as to him for whose sake they are made.
ALEXIS DE MCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 121-22. (Phillips Bradley ed. and Henry Reeve
trans., Vintage 1990) (1838).
2°5 See Hess, supra note 156, at 13-14: see also GEORGE SIDNEY CAMP, DEMOCRACY 100,102-04
(1841).
2°6 See HESS, supra note 156, at 16-17.
207 See id. at 20.
208 Id.
209 See id. at 19-24.
21 ° Id. at 24.
211
 See HESS, supra note 156, at 2'3-27,29,78-79.
212 Id. at 24. On the importance to Northern ideology of an educated, informed citizenry,
see Taslitz, Informed Citizen, supra note 199.
213 See HESS, supra note 156, at 98-102.
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war and during the early period of Reconstruction. 214 Their racism did
not justify the brutality of slavery, which so corrupted citizen virtue." ] '
Indeed, many Northerners concluded that blacks who fought in the
war showed sufficient virtue to merit their freedom. 2 "
Furthermore, Southern intransigence after the war largely took
the form of race-based violence that the North abhorred. 217 For exam-
ple, "[tin 1866,. various southern white militias 'composed of Confed-
erate veterans still wearing their gray uniforms terrorized the black
population, ransacking their homes ... and other property and abus-
ing those who refused to sign plantation labor contracts."' 21 s The Ku
214 See id. at 98-102; infra notes 215-30 and accompanying text.
217 See ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. His-
TORY 291 (1997) Smith noted;
Though they insisted that blacks were endowed by the creator with moral equality
in terms of basic rights, not even the most radical white Republicans really tried to
refute claims for the intellectual, emotional, and biological inferiority of blacks.
Many instead conceded such inferiority, only urging that it did not justify denials
of the rights ill the Declaration of - Independence.
Id.; see also infra notes 216-30 and accompanying text. While Northerners long held a distaste
for the abolitionist label, they did Mils ultimately enibrace what they called "emancipationist"
ideaS, partly because they were seen as necessary to preserving white citizen virtue, See, e.g., HESS,
SUPra note 156, al 81-114.
"'See, e.g., ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUB-
LICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 261 (1995) ("Yet the Republicans did develop a [pre-Civil
War] policy which recognized the essential humanity of the Negro [a] ]though deeply flawed
by an acceptance of many racial stereotypes . . ."); ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN
FREEDOM 97 (1998) [i1Creillarter AMERICAN FREEDOM] ("[T]he enlistment of 200,000 black men
in the Union armed forces during the second half of the war placed black citizenship on the
postYvar agenda. The inevitable consequence of black military service, one senator observed in
1864, was that the 'black man is henceforth to assume a new status among us.'"); Sistrrn, supra
note 215, at 298 ("Never one to romanticize white humanitarianism, W.E.B. DuBois contended
that for a 'brief period' in the late 1860s and early 1870s, 'the majority of thinking Americans of
the North believed in the equal manhood of Negroes.'"); PHILLIP SHAW PALunam, A PEOPLE'S
CONTEST: THE UNION AND CIVIL WAR 1861-1865, ID 198-230 (2d ed. 1996) (tracing evolution
of Northern emancipationist sentiment from war necessity, to sympathy for blacks who fought in
the war to, for many, moral necessity). Northern views on race were diverse, however, and- there
were sonic who held extraordinarily progressive views for their time. See generally STEWART, supra
note 194; DAVID AJ. RICHARDS, WOMEN, GAYS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE GROUNDS FOR
FEMINISM AND GAY RIGHTS IN CULTURE AND LAW (1998) [hereinafter WOMEN, GAYS, AND THE
CONSTITUTION].
217 See, e.g., MARY FRANCES BERRY, BLACK RESISTANCE, WHITE LAW: A HISTORY OF CONSTI-
TUTIOANL RACISM IN AMERICA 61-80 (1994) (summarizing the history of post-Civil War' Southern
racial violence): JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION AFTER THE CIVIL WAR (1 , 5 (2d ed, 1994)
('h. is almost impossible to exaggerate the Northern revulsion to incidents like the Memphis arid
New Orleans riots [against. newly-freed slaves] and other altercations of less magnitude, Small
wonder that the Fourteenth Amendment seemed more and more indispensable to the estab-
lishment of a just peace in die South.")
th'Ato-m. REED AAIAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 258 (1998)
(quoting ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINIS/ [ED REVOLUTION, 1986-1877, at 203
(1988) [hereinafter RECONSTRUC'TION] ).
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Klux Klan, in action. by 1866, similarly played a role in intimidating,
whipping and heating blacks into signing onerous labor contracts with
their landlords:2 ' 9 The Black Codes, adopted by the Southern states to
replace the Slave Codes, then employed to arrest blacks who breached
labor contracts, prohibited them from leaving their master's premises
and authorized hiring out black children and blacks unable to pay
vagrancy fines. 22°
Even apart from the Black Codes, however, the actions of South-
ern government officials supported anti-black violence."' When blacks
in 1866 and their white Republican allies convened in a hall in New
Orleans to discuss extending the franchise to freedmen, they were
attacked and slaughtered by a mob led by the city police, a force largely
made up of militant Confederate veterans. 222 Similarly, in Memphis, city
police played a key role in triggering violence against former black
servicemen. 223 A similar wave of violence against white Republicans
swept the South, but they were targeted precisely because they were
friends of the freedmen. 224 As these incidents suggest, Southerners had
not learned virtue from their defeat, and crushed early postwar North-
ern optimism about .Southern Reconstruction. 225 Stopping the eco-
nomic and physical terrorism that stemmed from the Southern char-
acter under slavery required more drastic action. Undisputedly, the
drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment sought to halt racially-moti-
vated violence, and thereby provide former slaves the same protection
from violence as was enjoyed by white citizens. 226
Ultimately, the North acknowledged that extending political, in
addition to civil, rights to blacks via constitutional amendment was
essential to achieving a lasting change in the Southern character.'"
2 13  See HERBERT SHAPIRO, WHITE VIOLENCE AND BLACK RESPONSE: FROM RECONSTRUCTION
TO MONTGOMERY 5 (1988) (on the Ku Klux Klan and labor contracts); .see atso JEFFREY ROGERS
HUMMEL, EMANCIPATING SLAVES, ENSLAVING FREE MEN: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
316-20 (1996) (on Klan violence more generally).
22,0 See, e.g., FONER, RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 218, at . 199-201; see also W.E.B. DUBOIS,
BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 160-81 (1935). Anger at Southern intransigence in adopt-
ing the Black Codes, combined with a variety of other tnotivations, led Congress to pass the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, which "canceled the Black Codes." KENNEDY, sn/Ira note 178, at 85.
221 See SHAPIRO, supra note 219, at 5-7.
222 See id. at 6.
2" See id. at 6-7.
224 See, e.g., id. at 5-29; FONER, RECONSTRUCTION, SUpTa note 218, at 425-38.
225 See FONER, RECONSTRUCTION, 811pra note 218, at 216-80 (tracing decline in Northern
postwar optimism in the face of Southern intransigence).
226 See, e.g., ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT 20-44 (1994). See generally FONER, RECONSTRUCTION, Sitpra note 218.
227 See HESS, supra note 156, at 112. For a more detailed explanation of the historical forces
behind these shifting views, see AMAR, supra note 218, at 181-214,268-78.
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The Reconstruction Amendments, therefore, while not condemning
racist personality per se, shoUld he seen as condemning the kind of
racist personality that viewed racially-motivated violence as central to
white equality and social order. Northerners during and immediately
after the Civil War considered citizen virtue as central' to the success
of republican governments and recognized that virtuous character is
shaped, at least in part, by circumstances, such as the power of free
institutions to Mold a republican personality. 22" Like their predecessors
in 1789, the framers of the 1860s 'envisioned a new social order, in
addition to a novel political one. 2 •, The 1860s framers, however, saw,
in a way that the original framers did not, that a just social order cannot
expose individuals to loss of civil or political rights because of their
membership in a particular racial group, nor can a racial or similarly
classified group as a whole be consigned to second-class citizenship. 214 '
This vision cannot be realized, however, by the courts acting
alone and, perhaps, not by judicial Action at all. Only legislatures are
equipped to enact the broad-based measures that are required to
combat the evils of Southern character. That is, in part, why the Four-
teenth Amendment includes section five, which declares that, "The
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legis-
lation:"23 ' Regulating hate crimes—which involve precisely the kind of
racially-motivated violence that the Fourteenth Amendment meant to
reject—requires legislative action. Hate crimes legislation thus merely
embodies the moral - judgment of the Fourteenth Amendment's fra-
mers that violence intended to subOrdinate because of race evidences
an unvirtuous character that merits our strongest condemnation.
228 See HESS, supra DOW 150, at 73-80,
229 The new social order was one of equal republican citizens whose virtuous character was
the antithesis of Southern citizen ideals. See supra notes 195-228 and accompanying text.
230 See generally KARsT, .01pro note 107, at 15L27, 49-57 (suggesting Fourteenth Amendment
best interpreted as promoting a sense of equal belonging to a shared political corimutnity); DAVID
A.J. RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION: HISTORY, THEORY, AND LAW OF THE RE-
CONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS (1993) [hereinafter. CONSCIENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION] (Recon-
struction Amendments embody a general political theory rooted in abolitionist thinking that.
structures the American political community in terms of universal human rights).
251 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see also TAstrrz, supra note 49 (explaining why the Consti-
tution sometimes mandates legislative rather than judicial action). See generally MARK TUSIINET,
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999) (arguing for a stronger legislative,
rather than solely judicial, 'Ole in interpreting and implementing the federal Constitution).
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C. On Interpretive Method
in stressing the "moral judgment of the Fourteenth Amendment's
framers," I am not arguing, however, that Congress specifically in-
tended to mandate the adoption of statutes similar to modern hate
crimes legislation. Obviously, they did not. Indeed, two of the leading
hate crimes critics, Professors James B. Jacobs and Kimberly Potter,
have pointed out that the two'post-Civil War civil rights statutes, respec-
tively sections 241 and 242 of Title 18 of the, United States Code, 232
were drafted to ensure that laws were enforced equally.on behalf of all
victims, regardless of race, prejudice, or criminal motivation. 233 Unlike
modern statutes, the post-Civil War statutes ignored the victim's race,
gender, and sexual orientation and focused on government actors'
thoughts and deeds, not private criminal actors' motivation.239
History's role in constitutional interpretation, however, need not
serve a narrow originalism, as a wide variety of modern interpretive
theorists have explained.•' David Richards' view is particularly helpful.
He summarizes his constitutional interpretive theory as follows:
The Reconstruction Amendments responded to the gravest
crisis of constitutional legitimacy in our history, and are best
interpreted as negative and affirmative constitutional princi-
ples responsive to that crisis and any comparable future ones.
Our interpretive attitude must be to make the best sense of
• them in light of the genre of American revolutionary consti-
tutionalism that they assume and to critically elaborate them
in deference to the narrative integrity of the story of the
American people and their struggle for politically legitimate
government that respects human rights."'
For Richards, it is the •principles enacted by these Amendments, not
the precise conceptions of their application by the Reconstruction
Congress, or the Amendments' ratifiers, that matters. 237 Indeed,
Richards expressly rejects reliance on the concrete views of the
232 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 241,242 11994). For a history of these statutes, see Frederick M. Lawrence,
Civil Rights and Criminal Wrongs: The Melts Rea of Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 67 Tot.. L. REV.
2113 (1993).
233 See JAEoRs & POTTER, Supra note 1, at 37.
234 see id.
235 For an outstanding survey, analysis, and critique of the various forms of originalism and
the role of history in constitutional interpretation, see MICHAEL J. GERHARDT &THOMAS D. Rowe,
JR., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES 97-128 (1993).
256 RICHARDS, WOMEN, GAYS, AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 216, at 16-17.
237 See id. at 18,21-22.
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Reconstruction Congress as reflecting momentary political compro-
mises rather than durable, albeit evolving, principles that the
Amendments embody."' Richards goes so far as to argue that the
views of feminist abolitionists—views specifically repudiated, in part,
by the Reconstruction Congress— best promote the political legiti-
macy and morality that our current generation of constitutional
thinking demands.""
Unlike Richards, I do not rely on the views of a wise but small
minority, i.e., the radical feminist abolitionists. Rather, I rely on the
ideological views of the Northern majority, the victors, on matters of
broad political morality. There are those who treat the Constitution
much like an ordinary statute: the command resulting from political
compromise.2 '° Under such a view, the South's understanding of the
Reconstruction Amettdments has great weight, for compromise with
southern views was necessary to the Amendments' ultimate adoption."
Such a view renders, however, the long struggle against slavery of little
meaning. As Professor Bruce Ackerman's detailed recent review of the
Reconstruction Amendments' history suggests, those Amendments arc
most fairly understood as having been imposed by the victors," 2 yet we
"B See id. at 18-22, 27-112.
2" See id. at 27-28.
"II think this is a fair characterization of al least the implicit approach in a novel, recent
originalist work, JAMES E. Boxy), No EASY WALK. TO FREEDOM: RECONSTRUCTION AND THE RA-
TIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1997).
2.41 See id. (stressing Southern elite views of the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning).
mAckerman's argument is far more complex and subtle than my text suggests. His latest
work, however, on the Reconstruction Amendments stresses the history of Northern efforts to
ram those Amendments down protesting Southern throats, a history that suggests that the victors'
views matter more than the losers'. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS
(1998). On the other hand, Ackerman declares that the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment
cannot be seen as "an outrageous case of textualist rupture and sectional imposition," id. at 184,
because the South was always deeply involved in the constitutional conversation. Furthermore,
Northern RepublicanS won a majority in the triggering election of 18(1(1 so decisive as to leave
them in control of Congress even if conservative Southern representatives were counted in
measuring who had the majority. See id. at 178-84. But Ackerman then describes in great detail
how the North imposed the Fourteenth Amendment on the South, for example, passing the
Reconstruction Act on March 2, 1867, prohibiting seating Southern representatives until their
state legislatures, and three-fOurths of all the states, approved the Fourteenth Amendment. See
id. at 186-252. Ackerman's work is most fairly understood as demonstrating that the North's acts
in coercing the South into ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment were not "outrageous" but
legitimate acts of "We, the People," though that is not necessarily a chitracterization of which
Ackerman would entirely approve. Ackerman is thus less interested in arty particular group's
purported understandings than in his nuanced notion of wlren and how "We the People" act to
achieve constitutional change. His argument indeed seems in part to be that the broader sweep
of American history matters more than do constitutional formalities. See generally BRUCE ACKER-
MAN, WE TitE. PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 3-57, 131-62 (1991).
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have recognized the Amendments' constitutional legitimacy for over
125 years. The Northern victors ultimately came to see the Civil War
in moral terms, and, to the extent that any group's views matter, the
victors' views at the level of moral principle deserve the most weight.
1 do not shy away, however, from the reality that my interpretive
claims are themselves moral judgments. Professor Robin West has
explained that our constitutional history reflects a tension between an
"authoritarian" impulse that views interpretation as a quest for discern-
ing the command of a sovereign authority and a "normative impulse"
that views interpretation as a quest for the answer to this question: How
should we constitute ourselves as a political commun ity?" 3 The authori-
tarian impulse is rigidly bound by the text, either as free-standing
authority or as the reflection of the original intent of its authors. The
text—and sometimes the intent of its framers—tell us how to live. 244
The normative impulse views text as persuasive and facilitative, and
text and the history behind it as a source of insight into how others
answered similar questions in the past. 245 Text and history, however,
help to illuminate, rather than mandate, how we should constitute our
political community today:24"
Both impulses, as West explains, are always at work to one degree
or another,247 a point that seems especially sound for broad, ambigu-
ous, aspirational terms like "due process" and "equal protection." 248 I
prefer to be candid about this observation. Consequently, I believe the
history recounted here of Northern concepts of virtue is helpful in
imagining a political community more cohesive and legitimate than
the one embraced by the false color blind neutrality of the hate crimes
critics. Why hate crimes legislation—rather than its absence—pro-
motes such cohesiveness and legitimacy is the subject of the next, and
final, Part of this Article.
IV. HATE CRIMES AND IDENTITY Pourics
By now it should be clear that the critics of hate crimes legislation
are wrong to argue that these statutes contribute to divisive identity
24:1 See WesT, supra note 226, at 192-98.
244 See id. at 195-98.
245 See id. at 192-98.
"6 See id.
247 See id. at 196.
248 Cf. RONALD ENORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READINC OF THE AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTION 7-38 (1996) (delimding interpreting constitutional clauses that are drafted in "exceed-
ingly' abstract moral language" in the "way their language most mutually suggests," namely,
incorporating abstract moral principles by'referetice).
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"Identity politics," as the critics define it, means that indi-
viduals relate to one another solely as members of competing groups
who recognize the strategic advantages of being labeled "disadvan-
taged" or "victimized."25" Such politics, say the critics, raise social
conflicts and undermine the unity of American society:251
These critics, however, misconceive the social functions served by
hate crimes legislation. Such legislation sends two powerful, comple-
mentary messages: first, that persons deserve to be judged as unique
individuals, not merely group members; and second, that the fates of
the individual and the groups to which he belongs are linked, and that
all groups and their members deserve equal respect in a republican
polity."' Such equal respect enhances the political, social, and eco-
nomic prospects for us all:45" I-late crimes legislation is based, therefore,
not on a model of scarcity in which competing groups battle over a
shrinking pie, but on a model of abundance in which cooperating
groups create a larger pie."'
Even more importantly, the fact is that hate crimes legislation
embodies the judgment that group hatred-motivated violence is fun-
damentally inconsistent with a republican government and culture. All
societies must battle criminal violence, but a republican society must
in particular battle violence stemming from group animus because
such violence centrally defines the master-slave relationship:255 To tol-
erate such violence is to let the seeds of slavery in fact, if not in law,
take root in a way that is inconsistent with a coherent republicanism:256
An incoherent republicanism smacks of illegitimacy, at least among the
groups victimized by the violence. That illegitimacy is fltr more divisive
than the welcoming attitude toward individual group identification
that hate crimes legislation reflects.
Professor Phillip Pettit's analysis of republicanism makes this point
clearer. Pettit argues that one critical strand of republican thinking, in
249JACOBS & POTTER, SUM note 1, at 130-32.
25° See id. at 5.
251 See id. at 10,130-32.
252 See supra Paris I, II,
253 See ROOM notes 99-152 and acc(nnpanying lext.
254 0n the alternative philosophies of scarcity and abundance, see REGINA M. SCHWARTZ,
Tin,: CURSE OF CAIN: THE VIOLENT LEGACY OF MONOTHEISM xi, 2-4,34-38,83 (1997). Northern
philosophy at the end of the Civil War was indeed one of abundance, lb r ending slavery and
promoting greater (albeit not perfect) racial equality would unleash sleeping Southern produc-
tive capacity, and expand the benefits of freedom for Northerners and Southerners alike, See
HESS, supra note 156, at 104-05.
255 See infra notes 257-SO and accompanying text,
256 See infra notes 257-86 and accompanying text,
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a tradition stretching hack to Cicero, holds that domination is the
ultimate social evil and that slavery centrally exemplifies such (tomb -Kt-
tion. 257 Slavery is defined as the power of one person (the master)
arbitrarily to interfere with the choices of another person (the slave),
even if that power is never exercised. 258 Slavery leaves the subordinate
party "vulnerable to some ill that the other is in a position arbitrarily
to impose."25" The master need neither offer reasons for nor consider
the interests of the slave in imposing this evi1. 26° Violence, of course, is
one of the key ways in which a master exercises this power. 261
One of the core evils wrought by criminal violence, moreover, is
the damage it may do to the apportionment of nondomination in
society as a whole. 2 i 2 When crime is perpetrated on a person because
of his group membership, everyone in the victim's vulnerability class
(i.e., his group) faces the permanent possibility of such interference. 263
That group then becomes subject to another's arbitrary interference,
becoming, by definition, slaves.
Part III of this Article demonstrated that the strand of republican-
ism identified in Professor Pettit's analysis is embodied in our post-Re-
construction Constitution. 264 Battling recurring manifestations of the
essence of slavery—as hate crimes legislation seeks to do—should thus
be seen as inherent in an American notion of a unified republican
culture.
Professor Margalit would go even farther, arguing that similar
, principles govern all just societies, not merely republican ones .265 For
him, a decent society is a prerequisite to a just society. 266 A "decent"
society, according to his definition, is one whose institutions do not,
by their laws or behavior, humiliate people. 267 Humiliation stems from
267 See PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM & GOVERNMENT 4-23 (1997).
2" See id. at 31-36, 52-57.
222 1d. at 4-5.
260 See id. at 31-36, 52-57.
261 See id. at 53, 57.
262 See PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM, Siepra note 257, at 67, 92-95, 151-56. See generally JOHN
BRA	 & PHILIP PETFIT, NOT JUST DESSERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(1991).
"See PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM, supra note 257, at 133-34, 154-56 (stating republicans rec-
ognize grievances of many social groups, including muld-culturalists, as republican causes aim at
the fair dispensation of, and increase in, non-domination, potentially a goal especially well-served
by the criminal law).
264 See supra Part III.
265 See AVISHAI MARCALIT, THE DECENT SC/CIF:TY (Naomi Goldhltim trans., 1996).
2'''' See id. at 1-4.
25? Sec id. at 1.
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the human capacity for symbol-based anguish. 2"8 Humiliation consists
of rejection from the family of man. 26"
The idea of rejection from the family of man, argues Margalit, is,
however, too abstract for practical social and political action. 270 But
once we understand the critical role of "encompassing groups"—
groups that are central to identity, that "shape [your] life as a human
being"271—a more practical working definition is suggested: humili-
ation is the institutional rejection of encompassing groups and their
members because of their group identity. 272 To reject such groups or to
discriminate against them in the apportionment of protection, status,
and other goods and services is to reject the way we express ourselves
as human beings and thus inconsistent with a decent society. 27a Decent
societies do not create second -class citizens. 27'
Of course, it may be argued that hate criminals are private citizens
committing wrongs in private ways. Social institutions are not involved.
Margalit rejects this perspective 275 because, for him, social institutions
2"8 See id. at 84-85.
269 See id. at 135-37.
270 See MARGALIT, 51.1pra note 2G5, at 135-37.
271 /d. at 137. It is beyond the scope of this Article to resolve the question of what groups
should be considered "encompassing" and thus should be covered by hate crimes legislation, but
Margalit helpfully identifies six characteristics. See id. at 138-40. Professors Jacobs and Potter
argue that the mere existence of a dispute over whom hate crimes laws should protect demon-
strates the pernicious nature of such laws. See jAcoss & POrl'ER, Slipra note I. at 132-34. First,
they argue, hate crimes laws cannot protect all culturally salient groups because the power of
these laws turns on their exclusionary nature. See id. at 132-33. To the contrary, 1 have argued
here, the power of hate crimes laws lay in their inclusionary message: all culturally salient groups
and their members are entitled to equal respect. Second, Jacobs and Potter contend that conflicts
in particular cases over whether or not a crime involves protected "hatred" promote intergroup
rivalry. See id. at 137-42. For example, Orthodox Jews in New York City complained because an
alleged crime by a Jew against an African American was labeled a bias crime. See id. at 138. But
the Jews did so because of their perception that another alleged clinic by an African American
against a Jew was not so labeled—that is, the Orthodox Jews believed that they were not given
equal respect. The dispute, in other wards, stemmed from a perceived failure to apply hate crimes
legislation evenhandedly-0 perceived breakdown in implementation, not in the underlying
justification of the laws. In any event, disagreement among affected groups about the outcomes
ill high-profile criminal cases is likely apart Iwtit any hate crimes legislation. The William Kennedy
Smith case (in which a wealthy medical student. was acquitted of rape, to the chagrin of many
feminists) is one notable example. See TASLITZ, 51{Pla 110Ic 49, at 82-91. Furthermore, conflict
over inclusion does not necessarily mean balkanization. The Civil Rights Movement ;MCI allied
movements of the 1950s and 1960s involved precisely such conflict, yet the ultimate result. has
been improved intergroup communication and an enhanced sense of a broad American com-
munity to which all citizens belong. See, generally SAMUEL WALKER, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION:
RIGHTS AND COMMUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA (1998).
272 See MAKGALIT, supra note 265, at 135-38.
2" See id. to 137-38,140-42,153,158-61,167-69.
274 See id. at 151-52.
275 See id. at 173-76. Margalit initially atgues that we must worry more about institutional
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must be defined broadly, and social inaction in the flice of group-de-
grading violence is a social responsibility:27" Ridicule, hatred, oppres-
sion, and discrimination against encompassing groups is thus simply
ittdecent. 277
Both Pettit's and Margalit's analyses, furthermore, suggest that the
antidote for anti-republican and indecent behavior is fundamentally
about molding particular kinds of human character. When Pettit talks
about a master-slave relationship, he paradigmatically talks about mas-
ters unwilling to renounce their arbitrary power over their slaves. 278 A
master revels in the fear and deference that stem from his and his
slave's common knowledge of the master's power to coerce the slave's
body or will. 270
 He wants a slave who cannot look him in the eye.'" A
relationship of domination presupposes a master with a predisposition
to dominate—a dominator, 28 t
When Margalit talks about social institutional responsibility for
humiliating private violence, he paradigmatically talks about the Ku
Klux Klan as a group based on humiliating others. 282 The image is of
Man individual expression because true former does more harm, in part because it is more likely
to be perceived as stemming from the society as a whole. See id. at 171-72. While he worries that
it is a 'close question," he ultimately comes down squarely for viewing the society's institutional
failure to prevent or punish individual acts of humiliation directed at minority group members
as such as an institutional harm, an act of indecency. See id. at 175-76. He would therefore go as
far as to ban the existence of groups like the KKK entirely or, failing that, to deny them a public
presence in our culture. See id. at 173-74.
276 See id. at 173-75.
277 See Mattcalsr, supra note 265, at 140-41.
278 See PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM, supra note 257, at 22-23,31,54-55,64,66. Thus, Pettit speaks
not only of the master-slave "relationship" but of being a citizen or a slave. See id. at 31. He notes
that even a kind master by definition is still one ready to exercise domination. See id. at 22-23,
51. This master's kindness, however, reduces but does not eliminate domination only if it takes
the form of the master's limiting Ids own power to act arbitrarily See id. at 64. Furthermore, he
sees good laws as those that inhibit potential "dominators," again the language of character. See
id. at 67-68. This point is made even clearer when Pettit approvingly cites Mary Wollstonecraft's
description of the effect of gendered slavery on women: "'It is vain to expect virtue from women
till they are, in some degree, independent of man .... Whilst they are absolutely dependent on
their husbands they will he cunning, mean, and selfish.'" Id. at 61 (quoting MARY Wou.sToNE-
CRAFT, A ViimicATIoN or THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN 299,309 (reprinted with new notes, Penguin
Books 1992) (1702)). Pettit further stresses that only citizen virtue can ultimately sustain a
republican society. See id. at 245-70.
27'J See id. at 63-64.
'"" See id. at 71.
281 See id. at 63-64.
282 See MARGALTI', supra note 265, at 173-76. Even more clearly, Margalit sees KKK members
as committed to a lerni of life" based on humiliating others, See id. at 174. For Margalit, race
hatred is a way of being, an all-pervasive denigrating attitude expressed in humiliating action—
that is, a predisposition to act or, in everyday parlance, a hateful character or personality.
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men eagerly, hungrily elated by their perceived subordinates' pain, 2" I
the very definition, say some philosophers, of the word "evil."'" Here
too, the sense is not of men actuated by momentary, passing hatred,
but rather haters, men consumed and constituted by their anger.
Hate crimes legislation rejects not just racial hatred but racists. We
each live lives that are at once private and public, part family man and
friend, part citizen.'"' These roles are both separate and intertwined,
thereby rendering the public/private distinction an often hazy one to
discern."'G Hate crimes laws reject both hateful messages and the haters
who spew them while embracing respectful messages among equal
republican citizens who pronounce and hear them. That is a recipe
for uniting, not splintering, American society.
283 See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 219, at xxi, 5, 10, 14-15, 82, 97-98, 123, i 32-33, 11)8-200,
254, 257-60, 297, 320, '380, 410, 44'3, 457 (describing the Klan and its activities).
4`1 ' 1 'faslitz, Two Concepts, supra note 11, at 6 (defining "evil").
285 'phis is a common feminist insight. See, e.g., ALISON M. JAGUAR, FEMINIST POLI'l'ICS AND
HUMAN NATURE 254-'55 (1988); RUTH LISTER, CITIZENSHIP: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 119-94
(1997).
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CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 1-50 (1993) (discussing flaws in the
state/private action dichotomy). See generally NtARcAul, supra note 265.
